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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The U.S. Census Bureau (2014) reports that from 1974 to 2014, the number of mid- 
to large sized firms in the United States grew at nearly twice the rate of small firms. As the 
average firm in the U.S. becomes larger and as corporations continue to displace small 
proprietorships in the marketplace, both salespeople and buyers are finding it more difficult 
to directly access decision makers within the other’s organization. In effect, agency 
relationships, i.e., relationships where “one or more persons engage another person to 
perform some service on their behalf” (Jensen and Meckling 1976; p.5), are becoming 
increasingly prevalent. Through two independent essays, this dissertation investigates two 
common, yet understudied, forms of agency relationships found in today’s business-to-
business (B2B) markets.  
Essay 1 
My first essay emphasizes the salesperson’s dual agency role in the customer-
salesperson- seller firm triad. Prior marketing research has primarily focused on either 
salesperson-customer or seller firm-salesperson relationships. This research adopts a 
triadic approach to examine the salespeople’s dual role. I conceptualize, measure and 
empirically examine a new construct, salesperson’s customer advocacy, the salesperson’s 
x 
 
actions to advocate for the interests of a specific customer to others within the seller firm. 
Although the salesperson’s dual role as seller representative and customer advocate has 
long been acknowledged, prior research focuses on the seller representative role. Drawing 
from agency theory, I explicate the salesperson’s dual role as agent for the seller and as 
agent for the customer and demonstrate the importance for researchers and practitioners to 
consider both aspects concurrently. A triadic dataset and complex triadic analysis reveals 
that both customers’ and seller decision-makers’ responses to salesperson actions directed 
specifically to them are moderated by the salesperson’s actions toward the other party. A 
subsequent experiment confirms the theorized mediating mechanism—that salesperson 
representation of the principal’s interests to the other party reduces perceptions of 
salesperson self-interest. This research introduces an important new construct, customer 
advocacy, extends traditional agency theory, and examines complex interrelationships 
among salesperson, seller and customer, offering new theoretical and managerial insights.   
 Essay 2 
In Essay 2, I explore the behavior of buyer advocates, individuals who advocate 
on the supplier’s behalf within customer buying centers, and the effects this form of B2B 
buyer behavior has on the supplier’s customer-level financial outcomes. As buying 
centers continue to increase in size, so does the number of individuals involved in any 
given purchasing decision. In a recent study of B2B buying centers, Schmidt, Adamson, 
and Bird (2015) note that an average of 5.4 people now formally sign off on purchases in 
B2B settings and that these members represent a much wider variety of jobs, functions, 
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and geographies than ever before. In response, suppliers have begun to rely on advocates 
inside the customer organization to establish consensus among buyer decision-makers.  
I present a new construct, buyer advocacy, defined as efforts by a buying center 
member to represent, support and defend a supplier during interactions with others within 
the buying center, and show how this form of B2B buyer behavior affects the supplier’s 
customer-level outcomes. I theoretically justify and offer evidence of a positive effect of 
buyer advocacy on the supplier’s sales while also providing theoretically grounded 
rationale for a countervailing mechanism, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales. An extremely high level of buyer 
advocacy risks raising suspicion from other members of the buying center. Second, 
relying on cognitive response theory, I test factors that moderate the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-level sales. Finally, I 
offer managerial implications, note limitations, and provide directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1: Motivation and Overview of the Research 
The U.S. Census Bureau (2014) reports that from 1974 to 2014, the number of mid- 
to large sized firms in the United States grew at nearly twice the rate of small sized firms.1 
As the average firm in the U.S. becomes larger and as corporations continue to displace 
small proprietorships in the marketplace, both buyers and sellers are finding it more 
difficult to directly access decision makers within the other’s organization. In effect, 
agency relationships, i.e., relationships where “one or more persons engage another person 
to perform some service on their behalf” (Jensen and Meckling 1976; p.5), are becoming 
increasingly prevalent. Through two independent essays, this dissertation investigates two 
common, yet understudied, agency relationships present in today’s business-to-business 
(B2B) markets.  
In my first essay, I explore the role that B2B salespeople play as agents for two 
principals, namely, customers and seller firm decision makers. While the salesperson’s 
role as agent of seller firm decision makers is well studied in the marketing literature, the 
salesperson’s role as agent of the customer has been almost completely overlooked. I 
attempt to fill this gap in the literature by conceptualizing and empirically investigating 
salesperson’s customer advocacy, defined as efforts by the salesperson to represent and 
advance the interests of the customer during interactions with decision-makers within the 
seller firm. I take a triadic approach to studying the salesperson’s role as mediator 
between the customer and seller firm decision makers. Nearly all prior empirical frontline 
employee (FLE) research has focused on variation in performance resulting either solely 
                                                          
1 Small-sized firms are defined as those with < 250 employees.  
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from FLE’s external relations with the customer, or solely from FLE’s internal relations 
with others within the seller firm, failing to account for interdependence among these 
three focal parties. As Vedel, Holma, and Havila (2016) point out, “some articles focus 
on…a single actor out of three, that is, the unit of analysis is the actor. They do not 
examine the possible relations between the focal actor and the other two actors. Others 
focus on a single dyad, but without studying the relations linking the dyad to the third 
actor.” As a remedy, Wuyts et al. (2004; p.479) suggest that researchers consider 
“shifting from a dyadic to a triadic perspective,” and that while the addition of a third 
actor essentially changes the network of relations among actors, they “are not 
fundamentally altered by further expansion to four or more actors (Simmel 1908).” 
Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook (1988) describe an essential characteristic of a triad as 
“connectedness…[if] exchange between A and B to some extent affects exchange 
between B and C, and vice versa,” without which the set of three is merely a pair of 
dyads. When interdependence among focal actors is suspected, as is the case in many 
FLE studies, failure to conduct triadic analysis may result in biased inference (Simmel 
1908; Burt 1992; Vedel, Holma, and Havila 2016; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988). 
Therefore, in this research I seek to address an under researched aspect of the 
salesperson’s role as agent for the customer, without neglecting consideration of the 
salesperson’s well-studied role as agent for the seller firm. 
My second essay explores the construct of buyer advocacy, defined as efforts by a 
buying center member (buyer) to represent, support and defend a supplier during 
interactions with others within the buying center to achieve consensus such that the supplier 
is positively evaluated. According to the 2017 Institute for the Study of Business Markets 
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(ISBM) research priorities, understanding the evolution of the B2B buying process is 
among the most pressing issues. This topic is closely related to the third-ranked 2016 – 
2018 Marketing Science Institute (MSI) research priority, “B2B Decision Making.” 
Specifically, MSI asks, “How is the B2B purchase cycle influenced by aspects of joint 
decision-making and committee decision-making? What is the influence of others in such 
joint decision-making? What is the path to purchase and what are the most appropriate 
marketing levers?” Clearly, questions about whether extant knowledge on buying centers 
and B2B buyer behavior is still valid are of extreme importance to both scholars and 
practitioners. Accordingly, in this research I attempt to shed light on these and other 
pertinent questions while exploring the buyer’s role as agent of the seller firm to gain 
consensus among a growing number of buying center members.  
 1.2: Contributions of the Research 
Essay 1. In Study 1 of the first essay, I show that salespeople’s value based selling, 
customer advocacy, customer-seller ties jointly influence the behavior of seller firm 
decision makers and the customer. These three-way interactions underscore the importance 
of salesperson credibility either within the seller firm or externally with the customer. In 
Study 2, I reveal that salespeople’s customer advocacy reduces customers’ perception of 
salesperson self-interest, which makes the customer more receptive to the salesperson’s 
value-based selling. Together, the findings extend the traditional dyadic approach in 
agency theory to a triadic approach wherein salespeople serve as agents for the seller firm 
and the customer, with important implications for managing salespeople’s customer 
advocacy and value-based selling behavior. 
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 Essay 2.  My research in Essay 2 builds on extant literature examining B2B buyer 
behavior, making several contributions. First, I theoretically justify and offer evidence of 
a positive effect of buyer advocacy on the supplier’s sales, while also providing 
theoretically grounded rationale for a countervailing mechanism, resulting in an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales. I then take the 
three-step approach of Lind and Mehlum (2010) to empirically validate this relationship. I 
show that buyer advocacy exhibits a strong positive association with the supplier’s 
customer-level sales, but only at low to moderate levels. High levels of buyer advocacy 
risk drawing suspicion from other members of the buying center. I find that, while suppliers 
should in general encourage and enable buyers to advocate on their behalf, there is danger 
in appearing overly optimistic about the supply relationship. This is an important 
cautionary note for supplier reps and buying center members as they seek to gain consensus 
among the various stakeholders within the buying center.  
Second, drawing from cognitive response theory (Greenwald 1968), I propose 
several factors that moderate the inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy 
and the supplier’s customer-level sales. I theorize and find evidence that when a buyer 
advocate places a low to moderate level of trust in the supplier, the way in which the buyer 
advocates for the supplier changes such that buyer advocacy is perceived by others in the 
buying center as being more balanced and practical, inducing fewer counterarguments. 
Interestingly, I find that when the buyer has low trust in the supplier, a “shape-flip” occurs 
such that the relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales is instead 
convex or U-shaped. Further, per the cognitive response model, I propose additional factors 
5 
 
that reduce counterarguments to the buyer advocate’s message are (a) communicator 
expertise (i.e., buyer education and industry experience) and (b) circumstances that affect 
subjects’ ability to form counterarguments (i.e., customer firm-supplier relationship 
dynamism and relationship length). I find that buyer expertise indeed magnifies buyer 
advocacy’s effect on the supplier’s sales as do factors that hinder the ability of others within 
the buying center to form counterarguments. By carefully explicating how the proposed 
moderators affect either the underlying linear or nonlinear mechanism, I provide a fine-
grained analysis of the phenomena under study which lends strong support for my theory-
based rationale.  
1.3: Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation consists of four chapters. Following the introduction chapter, the 
second chapter details the first essay exploring the role that B2B salespeople play as agents 
for two principals, namely, customers and seller firm decision makers and the construct 
salesperson’s customer advocacy. The third chapter details the second essay investigating 
buyer advocacy. Finally, the fourth chapter offers a conclusion and various implications 
drawn from both essays.  
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CHAPTER 2 – EXPLORING THE SALESPERSON’S DUAL ROLE: THE 
COMPLEXITIES OF SALESPERSON’S CUSTOMER ADVOCACY AND VALUE 
BASED SELLING IN THE SALESPERSON-CUSTOMER-SELLER FIRM TRIAD 
 
2.1: INTRODUCTION 
Today’s salesperson is a “bridge between the seller firm and its customers” 
(Gonzalez, Claro, and Palmatier 2014; p.78) and a “relationship manager working both 
sides of increasingly complex buyer-seller interfaces” (Plouffe and Barclay 2007; p.529). 
Acting as mediator between two parties, the salesperson serves a dual role as 
representative of the seller firm and advocate for the customer (Belasco 1966). 
Remarkably, prior research focuses almost entirely on the salesperson’s representation of 
the seller firm to customers, neglecting to account for the salesperson’s actions to 
advocate for the customer within the seller organization. I attempt to fill this gap in the 
marketing literature by conceptualizing and empirically investigating salesperson’s 
customer advocacy, defined as efforts by the salesperson to represent and advance the 
interests of the customer during interactions with decision-makers within the seller firm. 
Although there is little academic research on salesperson’s customer advocacy, a 
recent H.R. Chally Group survey of 80,000 business-to-business (B2B) customers in 
fifteen major industries found that customers value most highly the salesperson’s “ability 
to understand the customer’s business” and “customer advocacy to protect [customer] 
interests within the vendor organization” (chally.com; emphasis added). “Customers 
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expect a salesperson to advocate for them inside the vendor firm, navigating through 
internal processes and bureaucracy to solve customer problems and meet customer 
needs” (Johnston and Marshall 2011; p.1). Not surprisingly, salespeople appear to have 
grasped the importance of salesperson’s customer advocacy. Stevens and Kinni (2007; 
p.89) observe that B2B salespeople devote between “50 to 60 percent of their time” 
supporting customers’ interests within the seller firm, suggesting that B2B salespeople 
are primarily “advocates and expediters, representing the best interests of the customer 
throughout the sales engagement and within the seller’s organization” (p.40).  
This research accounts for both components of the salesperson’s dual role by 
integrating the salesperson’s customer-directed actions as representative of the seller-firm 
and the salesperson’s internally-directed actions within the seller firm as advocate for the 
customer. Salesperson’s customer advocacy is, of course, expected to benefit the 
customer by resulting in special benefits and customization. Less intuitively, however, I 
theorize that the salesperson’s customer advocacy efforts also impact the customer and its 
relationship with the salesperson, independent of any subsequent action of the seller firm. 
Drawing on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), I posit that the customer will 
respond more positively to value based selling, the salesperson’s efforts to craft a market 
offering on behalf of the seller firm such that the seller firm’s value proposition for the 
customer is effectively demonstrated (Terho et al. 2012; 2015), when the salesperson 
engages in customer advocacy.  
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Similarly, I theorize that the salesperson’s value based selling will also impact 
seller decision-makers’ receptivity to the salesperson’s advocacy for that specific 
customer. Decision-makers are more likely to provide special benefits in response to the 
salesperson’s customer advocacy when the salesperson is actively engaged in value based 
selling. As both salesperson’s customer advocacy to seller firm decision-makers and 
value based selling to the customer are theorized to have complex effects on both the 
customer and seller firm, I take a triadic approach, simultaneously considering 
implications from the salesperson, customer, and seller firm perspectives. No previous 
study of which I am aware has engaged in a simultaneous examination of internally-
directed and externally-directed salesperson actions and their effects on the behaviors of 
both the customer and the seller firm. This triadic approach acknowledges inherent 
interdependencies among these three parties with regard to the salesperson’s dual role.  
I test my hypotheses through the course of two studies. In Study 1, I use a 
complex dataset obtained in partnership with a Fortune 500 wholesaler, consisting of 
several forms of archival secondary data as well as matched survey data from 240 
customers and their salespeople. In Study 2, I perform an experiment involving B2B 
buyers to further examine the causal mechanism underlying a customer’s response to the 
salesperson’s internally- and externally-directed actions, as explained by agency theory. 
My focal research question is: What are the performance implications of the 
salesperson’s dual role as representative of the seller to the customer and as advocate for 
the customer within the seller firm? This question is subdivided as follows: 
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• Are the components of the salesperson’s dual role inherently interdependent? 
• Is the customer’s response to the salesperson’s representation of the seller firm 
dependent on the degree to which the salesperson also advocates for the customer 
within the seller firm?  
• Is the seller firm’s response to the salesperson’s representation of the customer 
dependent on the degree to which the salesperson also represents the seller firm to 
the customer?  
• What are the underlying theoretical mechanisms driving any observed 
interdependencies?  
• How do the salesperson’s actions as seller representative and customer advocate 
jointly affect the seller’s customer-level sales and profit?  
My research makes several meaningful contributions to the marketing literature. 
First, I introduce, conceptualize, and empirically test the importance of a new construct, 
salesperson’s customer advocacy. This highlights a vastly under-researched component 
of the salesperson’s dual role. I find that, although salesperson’s customer advocacy leads 
to increased sales and cross-buying, its complex impact on profit indicates it is a tactic 
that must be wielded carefully. These findings offer insight into the struggle that 
managers face when determining how and when salespeople should advocate for 
customers internally. Managers lack understanding regarding (a) the nature of the 
salesperson’s role as customer advocate and (b) the circumstances under which 
salesperson’s customer advocacy results in positive outcomes for the seller firm. 
Accordingly, managers are unsure how salespeople should balance their time between 
10 
 
representing the seller firm to customers and advocating for customers to seller firm 
decision makers. Previous studies have recognized that this uncertainty is a primary 
source of the tension between the sales force and marketing (Simester and Zhang 2014). 
Kotler, Rackham, and Krishnaswamy (2006, p.1) note that, “In too many companies, 
sales forces and marketers feud like Capulets and Montagues. Salespeople accuse 
marketers of being out of touch with what customers really want or setting prices too 
high. Marketers insist that salespeople focus too myopically on individual customers and 
short-term sales at the expense of longer-term profits.” My research sheds light onto the 
complex dynamic involving salespeople, internal decision makers, and customers, 
providing managers a better understanding of the importance of salesperson’s customer 
advocacy and the situations under which the salesperson’s actions as customer advocate 
lead to positive financial outcomes for the seller firm.  
Second, I demonstrate that the salesperson’s actions as agent of the seller firm and 
her actions as agent of the customer are indeed interdependent; that the degree to which 
customers and seller firm decision-makers are affected by salesperson actions directed 
specifically to them depends upon the actions the salesperson takes toward the other 
party. This finding underscores the importance for researchers and practitioners to jointly 
consider both aspects of the salesperson’s dual role, as opposed to considering either in 
isolation. Interestingly, nearly all prior empirical sales research has focused on variation 
in performance outcomes resulting either solely from the salesperson’s external relations 
with the customer, or solely from the salesperson’s internal relations with others within 
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the seller firm, failing to account for potential interdependence among these three focal 
parties. Because of the interdependence among the relations under study, I take a triadic 
approach to my analysis and consider the network involving the salesperson, customer, 
and seller firm decision makers as an interconnected system.  
Third, I identify and explore theoretically-grounded conditions under which the 
interaction between salesperson’s customer advocacy and value based selling can be 
diminished, strengthened, or suppressed entirely, requiring the inclusion of several three-
way interactions to the model. My findings stress the importance of the number of social 
ties between the customer and seller firms as a factor which forms an important boundary 
condition for managers and salespeople to consider. 
Finally, I demonstrate that the salesperson as dual agent can (a) allay the 
customer’s suspicion of the salesperson’s self-interest by advocating the interests of the 
customer within the seller firm, and can (b) allay the seller firm’s suspicion of the 
salesperson’s self-interest by actively representing the seller firm to the customer. In 
doing so, I extend agency theoretic research by demonstrating how agency theory offers a 
valid framework for understanding not only the response of agents to the actions of 
principals, but also for understanding the response of principals to the actions of agents. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the motivation of 
the research which involves a review of prior literature. Second, I develop my conceptual 
model and offer research hypotheses. Third, I describe the data, measures, and 
multivariate hierarchical Bayesian model used to test my triadic framework. Fourth, I 
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conduct a controlled experiment to uncover the proposed causal mechanism. Finally, I 
discuss my findings, offer managerial implications, suggest limitations, and provide 
directions for future research.  
2.2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1: Salesperson’s Customer Advocacy 
The salesperson performs the role of customer advocate when she acts as the 
customer’s representative during interactions with decision-makers within the seller firm 
to ensure that the products or services the customer has purchased deliver the expected 
value. The process of performing the role of customer advocate takes place during the 
sale and delivery of the seller’s value offering and, most importantly, where the customer 
has the least control – inside the selling firm (Stevens and Kinni 2007). Some of the 
objectives of the salesperson may include negotiating customer-specific pricing, working 
to tailor goods or services to fit the customer’s need, or sharing customer feedback about 
performance breakdowns.  
There are several concepts related to salesperson’s customer advocacy which have 
been conceptualized at the salesperson level. These concepts are cast as traits that vary 
between salespeople, devoid of any customer-specific or time varying elements. One 
such example is customer orientation, or a salesperson’s predisposition to meet customer 
needs in an on-the-job context (Brown et al. 2002; Donavan, Brown, and Mowen 2004). 
While I expect that a salesperson’s level of customer orientation may affect that 
salesperson’s tendency to engage in salesperson’s customer advocacy, these constructs 
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are undoubtedly distinct. Similarly, Schepers et al. (2012) define customer stewardship 
control as a frontline employee’s (FLE’s) felt ownership of and moral responsibility for 
customers’ overall welfare. The authors explain how FLE perceptions of stewardship and 
seller firm control mechanisms affect FLE performance of in-role and extra-role 
behaviors, and that customer stewardship control depends on drivers that reside at the 
FLE and team levels. Similar to customer orientation, customer stewardship control is 
conceptualized as operating exclusively at the salesperson level, implying that while 
customer stewardship control varies between salespeople, it is stable within salespeople 
(i.e., across the salesperson’s portfolio of customers). Customer stewardship control and 
customer orientation may therefore act as antecedents to individual salesperson behaviors 
such as salesperson’s customer advocacy, but they are distinctly separate concepts.    
2.2.2: The Importance of a Triadic Framework 
Nearly all prior empirical frontline research has focused on variation in 
performance resulting either solely from FLE’s external relations with the customer, or 
solely from FLE’s internal relations with others within the seller firm, failing to account 
for interdependence among these three focal parties. As Vedel, Holma, and Havila (2016) 
point out, “some articles focus on…a single actor out of three, that is, the unit of analysis 
is the actor. They do not examine the possible relations between the focal actor and the 
other two actors. Others focus on a single dyad, but without studying the relations linking 
the dyad to the third actor.” As a remedy, Wuyts et al. (2004; p.479) suggest that 
researchers consider “shifting from a dyadic to a triadic perspective,” and that while the 
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addition of a third actor essentially changes the network of relations among actors, they 
“are not fundamentally altered by further expansion to four or more actors (Simmel 
1908).” While in agreement with these scholars, I do not suggest that all research 
involving salespeople or other FLEs should necessarily involve triadic analyses. 
Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook (1988) describe an essential characteristic of a triad as 
“connectedness…[if] exchange between A and B to some extent affects exchange 
between B and C, and vice versa,” without which the set of three is merely a pair of 
dyads. However, when interdependence among focal actors is suspected, as is the case in 
many FLE studies, failure to conduct triadic analysis may result in biased inference 
(Simmel 1908; Burt 1992; Vedel, Holma, and Havila 2016; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and 
Cook 1988).  
2.2.3: Triadic Perspective – Seller-Salesperson-Customer  
Salesperson’s customer advocacy shares some conceptual territory with other 
related concepts in the domain of intraorganizational frontline research. In Table 2.1, I 
compare my study to the most relevant extant literature involving boundary spanners’ 
internally-directed actions. As depicted, mine is the only study to conceptually explicate 
and measure salesperson’s customer advocacy. Further, while each of these studies 
involves interdependent relations among three parties (i.e., customer, salesperson, other 
seller firm actors), none but mine takes a triadic perspective to jointly consider the 
salesperson’s internally- and externally-directed actions and their effects on the actions of 
both customers and seller firm decision-makers. Vedel, Holma, and Havila (2016; p.1) 
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note that in order to perform triadic analyses, the research must involve “information 
about three actors, the two or three relations that link them, and how these relations 
influence each other.” Prior intraorganizational frontline studies rely primarily on data 
gathered from salespeople, with a few studies (i.e., Bolander et al. 2015; Gonzalez, 
Claro, and Palmatier 2014; and Plouffe et al. 2016) incorporating archival data measuring 
customer response (e.g., sales). Interestingly, though these studies involve salesperson 
behavior directed internally toward members of the seller firm, mine is the only study to 
incorporate outcomes measuring the consequent actions of seller firm actors. Other 
studies in this domain thereby implicitly assume that the effects of the salesperson’s 
intraorganizational behavior on customer actions are independent of any effects the 
salesperson’s intraorganizational behavior has on members of the seller organization, 
though due to their dyadic research design they are unable to rule out the alternative.    
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2.3: THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 Agency theory is “undeniably among the dominant theories in economic 
organization and management” (Bosse and Phillips 2016; p.276). In Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976; p.5) foundational article, the authors characterize an agency 
relationship as forming when “one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent.” Over time, agency theory has broadened to 
encompass the ubiquitous agency relationship in which one party delegates work to 
another party who performs that work (Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theorists assume that 
all actors are self-interested, boundedly rational, that agents are more risk averse than 
principals, and that agents will seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of the 
principal in an imperfect labor market. As explained by Bosse and Phillips (2016), agents 
are able to operate in their own self-interest because of information asymmetry (e.g., 
salespeople, as mediators, have better information) and uncertainty (e.g., decisions about 
the best course of action tend to be subjective in nature and myriad factors contribute to 
outcomes). Any costs incurred by the principal in association with the agent’s divergence 
from the principal’s interests are known as agency costs. Traditionally, agency theory has 
dealt with principals’ efforts to minimize agency costs by resolving two specific 
problems: (1) how to align the goals of the agent with those of the principal so that they 
are not in conflict, and (2) how to reconcile differences in risk tolerances between 
principals and agents. Broadly speaking, researchers have drawn from agency theory to 
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predict agents’ responses to actions taken by principals (i.e., principals’ employment of 
optimal control mechanisms).   
Relying on the same assumptions, I draw from agency theory to instead explain 
the expected behaviors of principals in response to particular actions taken by agents. In 
line with prior conceptualizations of the salesperson’s dual role (e.g., Belasco 1966; 
Johnston and Marshall 2011), I recognize that because both the customer and the seller 
firm delegate work to the salesperson, an agency relationship is formed between the 
salesperson and each party. In effect, the salesperson is a “dual agent” and the customer 
and seller firm are both principals. Further, I assume that both the seller firm (as 
principal) and the customer (as principal) suspect that the salesperson (as agent) is self-
interested and is inclined to maximize her own utility at their expense. While Jensen and 
Meckling (1976; p.5) suggest that principals can limit divergences from their interests by 
establishing appropriate incentives, the authors caution that in spite of these efforts “there 
will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would 
maximize the welfare of the principal.”   
Therefore, even with appropriate incentive structures in place, when the 
salesperson engages in customer advocacy, decision makers within the seller firm may 
doubt that what the salesperson is advocating is truly in the seller firm’s best interests. 
For example, decision makers in the seller firm are aware that customizing the offering 
reduces required selling effort, making it easier for the salesperson to close business 
(Simester and Zhang 2014). The customer is similarly apprehensive when the salesperson 
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engages in value based selling. The customer may suspect that the salesperson’s value 
based selling is merely an attempt to influence the customer to buy more or to pay a 
higher price.  
I propose that either principal’s suspicion can be partially allayed when the agent 
demonstrates allegiance to the interests of that principal. When the salesperson actively 
engages in customer advocacy, the customer is less skeptical of and more receptive to the 
salesperson’s value base selling efforts. Likewise, when the salesperson actively engages 
in value based selling to the customer, the seller firm is less apprehensive of and more 
receptive to the salesperson’s customer advocacy. In both cases, when the principal 
believes the interests of the agent are more aligned with its own, the principal perceives 
fewer agency costs associated with the relationship, leading to greater perceived outcome 
value. In either case, when the salesperson exhibits alignment with the principal’s 
interests, the agent’s representation of the other party is met with less resistance and is, 
therefore, more effective at producing the outcomes the salesperson is seeking. For 
example, because seller firm decision makers perceive fewer agency costs and greater 
outcome value, they are more likely to be receptive to the salesperson’s customer 
advocacy and grant price concessions when the salesperson indicates that they are 
necessary.  Likewise, because the customer perceives fewer agency costs and greater 
outcome value, the customer is more likely to be receptive to the salesperson’s value 
based selling and purchase more and/or a wider array of products. 
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In line with this reasoning, I propose that (a) the customer will respond more 
positively to the salesperson’s value based selling when the salesperson advocates on the 
customer’s behalf, and (b) seller decision-makers are more likely to provide special 
benefits in response to the salesperson’s customer advocacy when the salesperson is 
actively engaged in value-based selling.  
However, the principal can rarely directly observe the salesperson’s other-directed 
actions. The salesperson’s customer advocacy occurs within the seller firm, out of the 
customer’s view. The salesperson’s value-based selling to the customer is seldom 
observed by seller decision-makers. Although both customer and seller decision-makers 
may observe outcomes that result from the salesperson’s other-directed actions (e.g., the 
customer may learn that the seller approved special benefits, the seller decision-makers 
may learn that customer purchases increased), the salesperson’s other-directed actions 
themselves are generally concealed and their connection with the observed outcomes 
cannot be known with certainty. The principal’s primary source of information about the 
salesperson’s other-directed actions as agent for the principal is…the salesperson. The 
principal is likely to be suspicious of the salesperson’s self-report, unless the principal 
has sufficient reason to believe the salesperson. I theorize that both the seller firm 
decision-makers and the customer will have greater confidence in the salesperson-agent’s 
reported other-directed behavior when there are a greater number of ties between the 
customer and seller.  
As the number of customer-seller ties increases, the structure of the seller-
21 
 
salesperson-customer network changes in two key ways: (1) network density increases, 
i.e., there is an increase in the relative number of ties in the network that link actors 
together (Oliver 1991), and (2) the salesperson’s degree of betweenness centrality 
decreases, i.e., the salesperson has less control over information exchange between the 
customer and seller (Freeman 1979). “As density increases (the number of ties between 
network members grows), communication across the network becomes more efficient. 
By virtue of having many ties, the network structure facilitates information exchange 
among all its regions” (Rowley 1997). Conversely, when the salesperson is the only link 
between the customer and seller, the salesperson acts as broker or gatekeeper and the sole 
facilitator of information exchange between the customer and seller (Scott 1991). As the 
number of customer-seller ties increases, the customer and seller acquire alternative 
channels to receive information. Greater customer-seller ties, in effect, provide a 
mechanism through which both the customer-principal and seller-principal can monitor 
the salesperson-agent. For example, a tie between the marketing department and the 
customer is a channel through which the customer can inquire if requests for price 
discounts have been transmitted via the salesperson and through which a marketing 
manager can ask if the salesperson has informed the customer about various ways the 
seller offers customer value.  
While this scenario is certainly plausible, it’s important to note that direct 
interaction between the customer and seller decision-makers does not actually need to 
take place for the ties to be consequential. The mere potential that the customer and seller 
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decision-makers could communicate directly without the salesperson’s involvement or 
knowledge is sufficient incentive for the salesperson to provide accurate reports about her 
other-directed actions. Both the seller and customer therefore have greater reason to 
believe the salesperson’s reports as the number of customer-seller ties increases.  
Thus, when the salesperson is the only source of information about other-directed 
behavior, the salesperson’s reports are likely to be discounted by both the customer and 
seller decision-makers suppressing the theorized Customer Advocacy x Value-Based 
Selling interactions. I anticipate that the theorized Customer Advocacy x Value-Based 
Selling interactions will occur when there are sufficient customer-seller ties. I 
hypothesize: 
H1:  Customer advocacy generates a more positive seller response (i.e., customer-specific 
discounts granted) when the salesperson also engages in greater value-based selling and 
there are more customer-seller ties. 
H2:  Value-based selling generates a more positive customer response (i.e., customer-
level sales and cross-buying) when the salesperson also engages in greater customer 
advocacy and there are more customer-seller ties. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes my conceptual model and the research undertaken in this study. 
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2.4: STUDY 1: TESTING THE TRIADIC FRAMEWORK 
2.4.1: Data Acquisition 
The dataset in my first study was compiled through the collaboration of a Fortune 
500 wholesaler headquartered in the United States. This B2B seller serves a large, 
diverse portfolio of reseller customers that operate in numerous industries. The firm 
provides an ideal context in which to test my model as the customers associated with this 
firm show significant variation in seller financial outcomes and their relationship types 
and interactions with salespeople. My dataset consists of data from a survey of buyers, a 
survey of salespeople, and secondary data from corporate databases. 
Customer survey. The customer survey was conducted first. When dealing with 
this seller firm, each B2B customer is represented by a single buyer who handles all 
purchasing vis-à-vis this seller. A link to the survey was emailed to the buyer for each of 
the seller’s more than 20,000 customers, followed by two subsequent reminders each 
separated by one week. Nearly 2,500 buyers completed the online customer survey 
during the 2-week response time frame, for a response rate of 10.2%. The final customer 
sample is very representative of the seller’s customer portfolio, with the percentage of 
each industry in the sample falling within five percentage points of that industry’s share 
of all the seller’s customers.  
Salesperson survey. Because my objective was to gather data from salespeople 
regarding specific customers to which they were assigned, responding customers were 
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each matched to their specific salesperson. The average number of customer responses 
per salesperson was 14 and ranged from a low of 3 to a high of 37 customer responses per 
salesperson. As the company’s segmentation is based primarily on customer size, 
customers were classified into five tiers based on total purchases (sales dollars) during 
the twelve months prior to the month the customer survey was launched. From the 
responding customers associated with a specific salesperson, I drew a stratified random 
sample of five customers (Homburg, Wieseke, and Torsten 2009), one from each of the 
customer segments. If there was no responding customer from a given segment, a non-
responding customer was chosen at random from those assigned to that salesperson. 
Two weeks after the customer survey concluded, all salespeople employed with 
the seller were surveyed. Salespeople were queried about their own behaviors and 
attitudes, their relationship with the selling firm, and their perceptions and attitudes about 
their relationships each of their five randomly-selected customers. Salespeople were 
informed that some, perhaps all, of those customers had already completed a customer 
survey, providing increased motivation for the salespeople to respond and carefully 
reflect on differences across those customers. 53 salespeople completed the survey during 
the subsequent 2 weeks, a response rate of over 90%.  
Final data set. Matching customer and salesperson responses resulted in 240 
customer-salesperson dyads with full information on the variables in this study. These 
240 customers are assigned to 53 salespeople, with an average of 4.5 responding 
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customers per salesperson. Archival pricing and transactional data for the three months 
following the completion of the salesperson survey were drawn from the seller’s 
database, aggregated and matched to each customer-salesperson dyad. Thus the final 
triadic data set used in my analyses comprises customer-provided, salesperson-provided, 
and selling firm archival data for 240 customers.   
2.4.2: Measurement 
I adapted published scales when appropriate and developed new measures when 
necessary. Reflective measures were used to operationalize the multi-item focal 
constructs in both the customer and salesperson surveys. Details are provided in Table 
2.2. 
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Customer advocacy. As I am the first to empirically examine the construct of 
customer advocacy (Advoc), I used a multi-step procedure to develop this measure. First, 
I interviewed 11 seller sales managers. The interviews lasted between 30 to 90 minutes, 
were audiotaped, and relevant statements were later transcribed and documented. I was 
particularly interested in the sales managers’ observations regarding the importance (or 
lack thereof) of salespeople representing their customers when interacting with other 
seller personnel. I asked them to recall their own experiences as frontline salespeople as 
well as their observations of their salespeople. I probed what they believe customers 
expect of salespeople, what seller management expects of salespeople, how expectations 
for these actions may vary across customers, and how salesperson engagement in these 
actions might vary across customers. These interviews verified that customer advocacy is 
not a salesperson-level construct, but that it is a salesperson behavior that varies across 
customers.  
Next, I developed an initial set of 12 items based on information obtained from 
the interviews. After removing synonymous and overlapping items, I sought additional 
manager feedback regarding the most important aspects of salesperson’s customer 
advocacy with the seller. I developed a customer advocacy scale consisting of four items 
that focus on looking out for this customer’s interests, acting as this customer’s 
representative, working to do what is best for this customer and advocating for the cause 
of this customer.  
Other variables drawn from surveys. The customer’s report of the salesperson’s 
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value-based selling (ValSell) is captured with four items modified from Terho et al. 
(2015) to align with my conceptualization of this construct as a salesperson behavior that 
varies across customers. The number of customer-seller ties (Ties) is the customer’s 
report of past interactions with other personnel from the seller’s seven functional 
departments, ranging from one (contact with one department) to seven (contact with all 
seven departments). I control for customer orientation (CustOr) with a scale adapted 
from Thomas, Soutar, and Ryan (2001). 
Variables from seller databases. Seller response to the salesperson’s customer 
advocacy is assessed by examining the total number of new customer-specific discounts 
(SpecDisc) offered to the customer during the three months following the salesperson 
survey. This is a conservative estimate of seller response, for the salesperson may 
advocate for a variety of seller benefits and customer-specific discounts constitute a 
subset of all customer benefits received. However, customer-specific discounts are 
frequently the objective of salesperson advocacy efforts for this seller and thus are a valid 
measure of seller response in the research context. Note that these are customer-specific 
discounts newly granted by the seller, regardless of whether the customer purchased 
those items during the focal three-month time period.  
Customer response to the salesperson’s value-based selling is reflected in the 
customer’s purchasing behavior. All outcomes variables were rescaled for 
confidentiality. Specifically, I examine customer purchases, the natural logarithm of the 
total sales dollars for each customer during the three months following the salesperson 
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survey (lnSales), and cross-buying (CrossBuy), the count of different items (SKUs) the 
customer purchased during the three months following the survey (Kamakura et al. 
2003).  
The collaborating seller invests extensive resources to maintain its activity-based 
costing system, employing a team of financial analysts and accountants whose sole 
responsibility is to ensure that operating expenses are appropriately allocated to each 
customer in proportion to the resources expended for that customer. For example, 
customers that log more phone hours with customer service representatives are allocated 
a proportionally larger share of the expenses tied directly to the customer service 
representatives and other fixed costs associated with the call center. This provides us the 
rare opportunity to examine customer-level net profit. However, as extant theory is 
insufficient regarding potential effects on net profit, I offer no hypotheses. In exploratory 
analyses, I examine the effects of customer-specific discounts and customer purchasing 
behavior on the seller’s customer-level net profit (NetProfit), the total dollar net profit for 
each customer during the three-month period following the salesperson survey. I also 
control for customer tenure with the seller (CustTenure), the natural logarithm of the 
number of days the customer had done business the seller at the time of the customer 
survey.  
2.4.3: Measurement Model 
I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the survey measures in this 
study. The measurement fit indices are: χ2(209)=681.58, comparative fit index (CFI) = .92, 
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Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .90, indicating that the model fits the data well (Bagozzi and 
Yi 2012; Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Cronbach’s alphas range from .71 to .97, 
indicating acceptable reliability for each scale (Table 2.2). I assess discriminant validity 
using the chi-square difference test (Anderson and Gerbing 1988); the differences range 
from 106.47 to 30,647, supporting discriminant validity. Convergent validity is also 
obtained, as all factor loadings’ t-statistics meet the Hatcher (1994) criterion and the 
average variance extracted were between .52 and .89 (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
2.4.4: Response Bias   
Survey response bias results when the outcome variables are observed only for a 
restricted, nonrandom sample. This can result when there are unobserved determinants of 
selection into the sample. Due to the high response rate to the salesperson survey (> 
90%), salesperson response bias is not a concern. I control for potential customer 
response bias using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. I first estimate the probability 
of a customer responding to the survey using relevant information for all customers in the 
observation window, including: whether the customer receives advertising from the seller 
firm; customer tenure; the customer’s credit limit with the seller firm; and the number of 
transactions the customer placed in the six months prior to the customer survey. I then 
created the inverse Mills ratio (λ) for each respondent, a monotonic decreasing function 
of the probability that each customer responded to the survey. The inverse Mills ratio is 
included in each of the four substantive equations in the model and controls for the effect 
of unobserved heterogeneity related to the selection process. 
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2.4.5: Endogeneity 
I took several steps to address endogeneity concerns resulting from potential 
omitted variables, simultaneity, and reverse causality. First, I instrument for the key 
substantive variables. To account for potential endogeneity of salesperson’s customer 
advocacy, I use the instrument: salesperson’s perceived customer advocacy incentives 
(CAIncent), the degree to which the salesperson perceives that customer advocacy efforts 
are embraced by the seller firm. To account for potential endogeneity of value-based 
selling, I use the instrument buyer exchange inefficiency (ExcIneff), the buyer’s 
assessment of time, effort, and resources wasted interacting with salespeople (Palmatier 
et al. 2008). A high level of exchange inefficiency indicates that the buyer perceives 
interpersonal exchange with salespeople as inappropriate and inefficient, leading the 
buyer to avoid salesperson interaction altogether. Both of these instruments will logically 
precede the endogenous variables and would impact the outcome variables in the model 
only through the endogenous variables. In order to evaluate instrument strength, I first 
assess the first-stage F-statistics and note that F > 10 in all cases for both instruments 
indicating that the null hypotheses, that the instruments are weak, should be rejected 
(Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).  Further, I generate and assess the minimum eigenvalue 
statistics and find that, in all cases, the test statistics exceed the critical values with 
rejection rate < 5% (Cragg and Donald 1993; Stock and Yogo 2005). I therefore reject 
the null hypotheses of weak instruments in both cases.  
 In line with my triadic conceptualization, I control for seller response (customer-
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specific discounts granted) in the equations with customer response as the outcome (sales 
and cross-buying), and I control for customer response in the equation with seller 
response as the outcome. I thereby mitigate a critical form of potential endogeneity, 
namely, that customer-specific discounts granted by the seller are merely a function of 
customer sales (customer size) or that customer purchases are merely a function of the 
customer-specific discounts granted by the seller. Controlling for customer response 
(seller response) when estimating the effect that salesperson actions have on seller 
response (customer response) ensures that the triadic analysis is properly specified and 
differentiates this research from prior studies in this domain (Table 2.1). Because the 
model involves three endogenous mediating variables with the potential for reciprocal 
causality, I identified three exclusion restrictions:  
1. Average distance between the salesperson and the salesperson’s customers 
(Dist) is the physical distance in miles between the salesperson and her 
customers. As customer-salesperson distance increases, face-to-face contact 
becomes more time-intensive, reducing the amount of contact a salesperson 
can have with each customer, impeding sales. However, the physical distance 
between the salesperson and customers should not directly affect the seller’s 
decision to grant discounts to customers, nor the seller’s customer-level profit.  
2. Salesperson’s cross-selling ability (CrossSell) is indicated by the total number 
of unique items sold by the salesperson in the period. A salesperson more 
skilled at cross-selling is more likely to persuade customers to engage in 
cross-buying, but cross-selling ability would not directly affect customer-level 
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sales or profitability.    
3. Customer-level sales growth (Growth) is the year-over-year percentage 
increase in customer-level sales. The seller’s management indicated that the 
seller may be more likely to grant discounts to customers with declining sales 
in an effort to win back business lost to competitors. However, customer sales 
growth should not directly affect customer-level dollar sales or profit.  
These variables are included for identification purposes in the equations involving 
sales, cross-buying, and customer-specific discounts as outcomes.  
2.4.6: Model Specification 
The multilevel data set contains survey and archival data from 240 customer-
salesperson dyads. In order to account for the anticipated relationships among the 
dependent variables, I conduct analysis using a multivariate hierarchical Bayesian 
approach to jointly model the equations for each of the four endogenous variables: 
number of customer-specific discounts granted by the seller for customer i associated 
with salesperson j (SpecDiscij); the natural logarithm of sales generated from customer i 
associated with salesperson j (lnSalesij); cross-buying by customer i associated with 
salesperson j (CrossBuyij); and net profit generated from customer i associated with 
salesperson j (NetProfitij). A Bayesian framework is preferred in this case because 
Bayesian methods do not require large sample theory (Gelman et al. 2013; Carlin and 
Louis 2010) and allow for joint estimation of the random effects among all equations, 
while at the same time allowing precise specification of non-normally distributed 
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dependent variables (SpecDiscij, CrossBuyij). The substantive regressors are: 
salesperson’s customer advocacy (Advocij), value-based selling (ValSellij), and customer-
seller ties (Tiesij). All regressors are mean-centered and standardized to aid in 
interpretation (Aiken and West 1991; Echambadi and Hess 2007; Gelman 2008). I 
incorporate the salesperson’s perceived customer advocacy incentives (CAIncentj) as an 
instrument for customer advocacy and the buyer’s exchange inefficiency (ExIneffij) as an 
instrument for value-based selling such that: 
(1) Advocij ~ Normal(μ1, σ21), where μ1 = α0j  
such that,  
α0j ~ Normal(η1_1, σ21_1), where η1_1 = γ1_1_0 + γ1_1_1CAIncentj, and 
(2) ValSellij ~ Normal(μ2, σ22), where μ2 = β0j + β1ExcIneffij  
such that,  
β0j ~ Normal(η2_1, σ22_1), where η2_1 = γ2_1_0.    
 As customer-specific discounts granted, SpecDiscij, is an over-dispersed count 
variable, it is modeled using the negative binomial PDF:  
(3) SpecDiscij ~ Negative Binomial(r,φ) 
where, 
r  =  exp(ζ0j  +  ζ1Advocij  +  ζ2ValSellij  +  ζ3Tiesij  +  ζ4Advoc*ValSellij   
+  ζ5Advoc*Tiesij  +  ζ6ValSell*Tiesij  +  ζ7Advoc*ValSell*Tiesij   
+  ζ8lnSalesij  +  ζ9CrossBuyij  +  ζ10Growthij  +  ζ11CustTenureij  +  ζ12λij) 
 
such that, 
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 ζ0j ~ Normal(η3_1, σ23_1), where η3_1 = γ3_1_0 + γ3_1_1CustOrj. 
  
The natural logarithm of customer-level sales, lnSalesij, is modeled using the 
normal PDF: 
(4) lnSalesij ~ Normal(μ4, σ24) 
where, 
μ4  =  θ0j  +  θ1Advocij  +  θ2ValSellij  +  θ3Tiesij  +  θ4Advoc*ValSellij  
+ θ5Advoc*Tiesij  +  θ6ValSell*Tiesij  +  θ7Advoc*ValSell*Tiesij   
+  θ8SpecDiscij  +  θ9CustTenureij  +  θ10λij 
 
such that, 
θ0j ~ Normal(η4_1, σ24_1), where η4_1 = γ4_1_0 + γ4_1_1Distj + γ4_1_2CustOrj. 
As customer cross-buying, CrossBuyij, is an over-dispersed count variable, it is 
modeled using the negative binomial PDF: 
(5) CrossBuyij ~ Negative Binomial(r2,φ2)  
where, 
r2  =  exp(π0j  +  π1Advocij  +  π2ValSellij  +  π3Tiesij  +  π4jAdvoc*ValSellij   
+  π5Advoc*Tiesij  +  π6ValSell*Tiesij  +  π7Advoc*ValSell*Tiesij   
+  π8SpecDiscij  +  π9CustTenureij  +  π10λij) 
 
such that, 
π0j ~ Normal(η5_1, σ25_1), where η5_1 = γ5_1_0 + γ5_1_1CrossSellj + γ5_1_2CustOrj. 
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Finally, customer-specific profit, NetProfitij, is modeled using the normal PDF: 
(6) NetProfit ~ Normal(μ6, σ26) 
where,  
μ6  =  ψ0j  +  ψ1Advocij  +  ψ2ValSellij  +  ψ3Tiesij  +  ψ4Advoc*ValSellij  
+ ψ5Advoc*Tiesij  +  ψ6ValSell*Tiesij  +  ψ7Advoc*ValSell*Tiesij   
+  ψ11lnSalesij  +  ψ12CrossBuyij  +  ψ13SpecDiscij  +  ψ14CustTenureij  +  ψ15λij 
 
such that,  
ψ0j ~ Normal(η6_1, σ26_1), where η6_1 = γ6_1_0 + γ6_1_1CustOrj. 
 Random intercepts α0j (Equation 1), β0j (Equation 2), ζ0j (Equation 3), θ0j 
(Equation 4), π0j (Equation 5), and ψ0j (Equation 6) are linked via a multivariate normal 
hierarchical prior. The estimation of the covariance matrix (Σ) of the random intercepts 
accounts for correlations between the dependent variables. I estimated the model using 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), executing the sampler for a total of 220,000 draws. 
The first 20,000 draws were discarded as burn-in. Subsequently, 200,000 draws of the 
MCMC chain were thinned by a factor of 10, leading to 20,000 posterior draws for each 
parameter. I used non-informative priors for all parameters. Variance inflation factors are 
all below 3.5, well under the recommended threshold of 5 (O’Brien 2007), suggesting 
multicollinearity is not a concern. Using the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic, I assess 
convergence for all model parameters by producing multiple Markov chains with 
randomly dispersed initial values. I find that all potential scale reduction factors are 
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below 1.1 indicating that convergence has been reached (Brooks and Gelman 1997). 
Table 2.3 presents summary and reliability statistics and for all variables. Table 2.4 
summarizes substantive estimation results and the posteriors (i.e., estimates) for the 
parameters in the multivariate model.  
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2.4.7: Results & Discussion2 
I note significant effects of salesperson’s perceived customer advocacy incentives 
on customer advocacy (b = .362) and buyer exchange inefficiency on value-based selling 
(b = -1.109), as expected. I find strong effects of salesperson’s customer advocacy on 
seller and customer responses. Customer advocacy exhibits significant simple effects on 
customer-specific discounts granted (b = .49), sales (b = 1.84) and cross-buying (b = 
.61). As hypothesized, I find a significant three-way interaction among customer 
advocacy, value based selling, and customer-seller ties on customer-specific discounts (b 
= .34). As depicted in Figure 2.2a, customer advocacy is more effective in motivating 
seller response when the salesperson also engages in greater value-based selling and there 
are more customer-seller ties. H1 is supported. 
 Figure 2.2: Seller Response to Salesperson Customer Advocacy & Value-Based Selling:  
Customer-Specific Discounts Granted 
 
Panel 2.2a:  High Customer-Seller Ties 
 
Panel 2.2b:  Low Customer-Seller Ties 
 
 
 
Note: High and low levels displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean.  
                                                          
2 All in-text parameter estimates are significant (i.e., 95% credible interval not containing zero). 
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Also as hypothesized, I find a significant three-way interaction among customer 
advocacy, value based selling, and customer-seller ties on sales (b = 0.72) and cross-
buying (b = 0.31). As depicted in Figure 2.3a and 2.3c, value-based selling is more 
effective in motivating customer response when the salesperson also engages in greater 
customer advocacy and there are more customer-seller ties. When a salesperson engages 
in a high level of advocacy for a customer and the customer has some ability to verify the 
salesperson’s actions, that customer responds to value-based selling by placing more 
purchases and buying a wider variety of items from the seller. It should be noted that 
value-based selling is particularly counter-productive in terms of motivating customer 
purchases when a salesperson does not also engage in greater customer advocacy and 
customer-seller ties are high (Figure 2.3a). This may be evidence of a betrayal effect; the 
customer-principal may conclude that the salesperson is very enthusiastically 
representing the seller via value-based selling, but not as energetically serving as an 
effective agent-advocate for the customer. H1 is supported. 
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Figure 2.3: Customer Response to Customer Advocacy & Value-Based Selling 
  
Customer-level Sales 
Panel 2.3a:  High Customer-Seller Ties 
 
Panel 2.3b:  Low Customer-Seller Ties 
 
Customer-level Cross-buying 
Panel 2.3c:  High Customer-Seller Ties 
 
 
Panel 2.3d:  Low Customer-Seller Ties 
 
Note: High and low levels displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean.  
 
 
Finally, my analyses reveal a significant negative effect of customer-specific 
discounts granted on net profit (b = – 4.88) and significant positive effects of sales (b = 
2.40) and cross-buying (b = 1.35) on net profit.  
To summarize, I find support for my theory-based hypotheses—that there is a 
positive three-way interaction of salesperson’s customer advocacy, value-based selling 
and customer-seller ties and on seller and customer response. I find that customer-seller 
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ties enable the interaction between customer advocacy and value-based selling on 
customer-specific discounts granted by the seller (H1). I find that customer-seller ties also 
enable the interaction between customer advocacy and value-based selling on the 
customer’s sales and cross-buying (H2). In Study 2, I conduct an experiment to provide 
another test of the hypothesized effects on customer-response (sales) and to examine the 
theorized underlying agency mechanism.  
2.5: STUDY 2 - DEMONSTRATING THE THEORETICAL MECHANISM 
 I conduct a second study to provide additional evidence for the hypothesized 
effects on the customer-response variables from Study 1 while drawing out the 
underlying causal mechanism as explained by agency theory. In Study 1, I observed a 
positive 3-way interaction of customer advocacy × value-based selling × customer-seller 
ties on customer-level sales, where the customer has greater confidence that the 
salesperson’s reports of customer advocacy when there are greater customer-seller ties. In 
Study 2, I directly manipulate the customer’s conclusions regarding the salesperson’s 
customer advocacy, which corresponds to the situation in Study 1 where the salesperson 
engages in customer advocacy and there are greater customer-seller ties that reinforce the 
customer’s belief in that advocacy. In Study 2, I therefore focus on the two-way 
interaction of the customer’s conclusions regarding the salesperson’s customer advocacy 
and value-based selling. 
2.5.1: Method 
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Following the conclusion of Study 1, 158 randomly-selected customers of the 
collaborating seller who did not participate in Study 1 were recruited to participate in a 
brief online scenario-based experiment. After participating, four buyers indicated that 
they could not realistically envision the assigned scenario and two buyers failed attention 
checks, leaving 152 responses upon which to perform the analysis. Sample sizes range 
from 36 – 41 per cell. All participants read the following description: 
Please envision that you are a customer of a fictitious supplier called Generic Wholesale, 
who has provided you a salesperson.   
Next, I manipulated the buyer’s perception of the salesperson’s level of customer 
advocacy as follows: 
You believe that your salesperson from Generic Wholesale has been (1) very strong / (2) 
very weak in representing your company’s interests to decision makers within Generic 
Wholesale. You think your salesperson from Generic Wholesale is (1) a very good / (2) 
not a very good representative for you within his company;  
and I manipulated the buyer’s perception of the salesperson’s value based selling:  
At the same time, your salesperson from Generic Wholesale invests (1) great effort / (2) 
very little effort in demonstrating how Generic Wholesale’s products and services can 
benefit your company financially. 
Dependent Variables. My mediating and dependent variables were measured 
using 7-point semantic differential scales, with the dependent variable measured prior to 
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the mediating variable in order to minimize hypothesis guessing. After being assigned to 
one of the four treatment conditions, participants were asked to report their expected 
overall purchases (Sales) and perception of the salesperson’s self-interest (Self-interest). 
Participants rated the salesperson from “Ralph has my interests at heart” to “Ralph is 
really only self-interested,” with a higher value indicating greater perceived salesperson’s 
self-interest.        
I estimate two models in order to clearly demonstrate the underlying mediating 
process. Estimated coefficients for both models are provided in Table 2.5. 
 Table 2.5: Study 2 Results 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variables Sales   
Salesperson 
Self-Interest Sales 
     
Value-Based Selling (ValSell) .699*  –0.608 1.189** 
 (.302)  (.329) (.247) 
 
Customer Advocacy (Advoc) 1.833**  –1.207** 2.155** 
 (.295)  (.321) (.270) 
 
Salesperson’s Self-Interest     .472 
    (.538) 
 
ValSell * Advoc 1.117**  –1.071*  
 (.428)  (.466)  
 
ValSell * Salesperson's Self-Interest    –1.090* 
    (.534) 
     
Constant 1.923**  4.744** 1.618** 
 (.211)  (.230) (.304) 
R2 .51  .35 .47 
Note: Continuous regressors standardized 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05     
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Model 1 specification.  In Model 1, I regress sales on value based selling, 
salesperson’s customer advocacy, and the interaction between the two, such that 
(7) Salesi = α0 + α1CAi + α2VBSi + α3CA*VBSi + ε1i, 
where CA and VBS are dummy variables indicating high or low salesperson’s customer 
advocacy and value based selling conditions for customer i, respectively.   
Model 1 results.  I find significant simple effects of both value based selling (b = 
0.699, p<.05) and salesperson’s customer advocacy (b = 1.833, p<.01). Further, 
matching closely to the related results from Study 1, I observe a significant interaction 
between value based selling and salesperson’s customer advocacy (b = 1.117, p<.01). As 
depicted in Figure 2.4, the effect of value-based selling on sales is enhanced as customer 
advocacy increases.  
 Figure 2.4: Value-based selling * Customer Advocacy  Sales 
  
Model 2 specification.  In Model 2, I extend Model 1 by incorporating the 
proposed mediating variable, buyer perceived salesperson’s self-interest (Self-interest).  
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Figure 2.5: Conceptual Depiction of Equations 8 and 9 
 
I estimate the two equations comprising the path model depicted in Figure 2.5 via 
three-stage least squares (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010), such 
that 
(8) Self-interesti = β0 + β1CAi + β2VBSi + β3CA*VBSi + ε2i 
and 
(9) Salesi = γ0 + γ1VBSi + γ2Self-interesti + γ3VBS*Self-interesti + γ4CAi + ε3i. 
Note that in Equation 9, I include the terms representing value based selling and the 
interaction between value based selling and salesperson’s customer advocacy for 
identification purposes.  
Model 2 results.  I find a significant negative simple effect of salesperson’s 
customer advocacy (b = 1.207, p<.01) on buyer perceived salesperson’s self-interest, but 
no simple effect of value based selling. Interestingly, I find a significant interaction 
between value based selling and salesperson’s customer advocacy on salesperson’s self-
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interest (b = -1.071, p<.05). Further, as expected, I observe a significant simple effect of 
value based selling (b = 1.189, p<.01) on sales, but no simple effect of salesperson’s self-
interest on sales. I also observe a significant simple effect of salesperson’s customer 
advocacy on sales (b = 2.155, p<.01), suggesting partial mediation. Finally, as theorized, 
I observe a significant interaction between value based selling and buyer perceived 
salesperson’s self-interest on sales (b = -1.090, p<.05). As depicted in Figure 2.6, this 
result confirms that the positive relationship between value-based selling and sales is 
enhanced as the buyer perceives the salesperson to be less self-interested.   
 Figure 2.6: Value-based selling * Salesperson’s Self-Interest  Sales 
  
 Discussion. In Study 2, I replicate a portion of the results from Study 1 while also 
demonstrating the underlying causal mechanism, offering support for my theoretical 
rationale.  As in Study 1, I find that the positive association between value based selling 
and sales is enhanced when the customer perceives the salesperson to engage in high 
customer advocacy. Extending further, I demonstrate that the moderating effect of 
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salesperson’s customer advocacy is itself mediated by the buyer’s perception of the 
salesperson’s self-interest, in line with agency theory. Specifically, I observe that when 
the salesperson engages in high levels of customer advocacy, the buyer perceives the 
salesperson’s interests to be more aligned with her own. When the buyer perceives 
greater alignment between her interests and the interests of the salesperson, she is less 
skeptical of the salesperson’s value based selling efforts, thereby making these efforts 
more effective at generating increased sales. 
2.6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
What are the performance implications of the salesperson’s dual role as 
representative of the seller firm to the customer and as advocate for the customer within 
the seller firm? I find there are many implications of both aspects of the salesperson’s 
dual role on customer and seller firm actions. In Study 1, I observe that salesperson’s 
customer advocacy has significant positive simple effects on all three of the customer and 
seller outcome variables. This finding is a strong indication of the importance of the 
salesperson’s customer advocacy to both the customer and the seller and suggests that 
there is a need for more research on this aspect of the salesperson’s role. Further, because 
I control for the actions of the seller firm when estimating the impact of salesperson’s 
customer advocacy and value based selling on customer actions, and I also control for the 
actions of the customer when estimating the impact of salesperson’s customer advocacy 
and value based selling on seller firm actions, I am able to estimate the “direct” effects of 
the salesperson’s externally- and internally-directed actions on the actions of customers 
and seller firm decision-makers. In other words, I am able to isolate the effects of 
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salesperson’s customer advocacy and value based selling on the actions of customers, 
while holding constant the subsequent actions of the seller firm, and vice versa. I find 
that salesperson’s customer advocacy indeed has a strong effect on the actions of 
customers, independent of any action taken by the seller in response to the salesperson’s 
customer advocacy efforts. Similarly, I find that seller firm decision-makers are strongly 
affected by the salesperson’s value based selling efforts, independent of how these efforts 
produce effects in customer behavior. By performing triadic analysis, I incorporate and 
control for the actions of both the seller and the customer to more accurately estimate the 
effects of salesperson’s customer advocacy and value based selling on the outcomes of 
interest.  
Are there inherent interdependencies between the salesperson’s actions as agent 
of the seller firm and the salesperson’s actions as agent of the customer? Yes. I observe 
that the customer’s response to the salesperson’s representation of the seller firm is 
indeed dependent on the degree to which the salesperson also advocates for the customer 
within the seller firm. I also find the seller’s response to the salesperson’s representation 
of the customer is dependent on the degree to which the salesperson also represents the 
seller firm to the customer. I find that focusing solely on the salesperson’s externally-
directed actions as representative of the seller firm may not capture the full impact of a 
salesperson’s actions on customer-level sales and profit, underscoring the importance for 
researchers to jointly consider both aspects of the salesperson’s dual role.  
2.6.1: Theoretical Implications 
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The importance of the salesperson’s customer advocacy. I conceptualize, study 
and empirically demonstrate the importance of a new construct, salesperson’s customer 
advocacy. The construct captures the previously neglected salesperson role as 
representative of the customer to others within the seller. Customer advocacy has 
significant positive simple effects on both customer response (sales and cross-buying) 
and seller response (customer-specific discounts granted). Customer advocacy also 
interacts with value-based selling in determining customer response and seller response. 
It can also impact customer perception of salesperson self-interest, which in turn impedes 
the potential positive effects of value-based selling on customer response (Study 2). 
Customer advocacy affects both the customer and the seller in less-than-obvious ways, 
suggesting that customer advocacy is a construct deserving of future research attention. 
When is a triadic approach advisable? Most prior sales-related research has 
focused either on the salesperson’s interfirm relations with the customer or the 
salesperson’s intrafirm relations within the seller firm, but not both. Depending on the 
specific hypotheses and constructs under investigation, triadic analysis may not be 
necessary. However, when there is interdependence among the seller, salesperson and 
customer, triadic analysis is advisable as it provides a more comprehensive examination 
of potentially complex effects. What the salesperson does in its interfirm relationship 
with the customer can affect not only the customer but also the seller and the 
salesperson’s relations with the seller. What the salesperson does in its intrafirm activities 
within the seller can affect not only the seller but also the customer and the salesperson’s 
55 
 
relationship with the customer. For these reasons, I simultaneously examine the dual 
roles salespeople play in the seller-salesperson-customer triad as an advocate for the 
customer within the seller and as a representative of the seller to the customer. My triadic 
analyses allows me to incorporate and control for the actions of both seller and customer 
to more accurately estimate the effects of salesperson’s customer advocacy and value-
based selling.  
The relevance of agency theory in B2B relationships. I draw on agency theory as 
the underlying rationale for my hypotheses, find support for my core hypothesis in two 
complementary studies, and provide compelling evidence for the theorized mediating 
variable drawn from agency theory in support of the rationale. I submit that 
conceptualizing the salesperson in business-to-business relationships as an agent of the 
seller when representing the seller to the customer and as an agent of the customer when 
representing the customer to others within the seller can provide new insights. In this 
research, I draw on classic agency theory but apply it in a novel way. Typically, agency 
theory is used to understand how the principal can shape, influence, limit or motivate the 
actions of the agent. In contrast, I draw on agency theory to generate hypotheses 
regarding how the agent’s actions can shape, influence, and impact the behavioral 
responses of the principal in ways that diminish the principal’s control over the agent. 
The salesperson’s dual agency roles. I demonstrate that the salesperson’s well-
researched role as representative of the seller to the customer is inherently accompanied 
by the salesperson’s under-researched role as advocate for the customer within the seller. 
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These roles as agent for the seller and agent for the customer are not independent, but are 
complementary and entwined in a complex manner. The responses of both the customer 
and seller decision-makers to salesperson actions directed specifically to them depends 
on the salesperson’s actions directed to the other party. Focusing solely on the 
salesperson’s interfirm actions as representative-agent of the seller may not fully capture 
the salesperson’s impact on the customer-level sales and cross-buying, nor will focusing 
solely on the salesperson’s intrafirm actions as advocate-agent for customer fully grasp 
the salesperson’s impact on seller decisions to grant special benefits. Certainly, any 
assessment of the impact of salesperson activities such as customer advocacy or value-
based selling on customer-level sales or profit would benefit from a more comprehensive 
examination of the salesperson’s dual agency and both intrafirm and interfirm effects.  
The potential dangers of value-based selling. Although value-based selling can be 
a very positive strategy in some business markets (Terho et al. 2015), there also is 
evidence that it can cause conflict and be counterproductive in some situations (Terho et 
al. 2012). My research provides one explanation for these mixed effects; value-based 
selling is likely to be ineffective in motivating customer response if it is not accompanied 
by salesperson customer advocacy. When the customer suspects that the salesperson’s is 
acting out of self-interest, rhapsodizing about the ways the customer will receive value 
and benefit financially from doing business with the seller is likely to be met with 
skepticism and disbelief. However, value-based selling may nevertheless have a positive 
impact on the salesperson’s relationship within the seller firm. 
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The importance of interfirm ties. My research confirms the criticality of 
considering network structure in B2B relationships. As the salesperson’s customer 
advocacy occurs outside the customer’s view, the customer relies primarily on 
salesperson reports about advocacy. Without sufficient means by which to monitor the 
salesperson and salesperson incentive to provide honest information, salesperson reports 
of customer advocacy will be doubted, discounted, or discredited. Value-based selling, 
even when accompanied by high customer advocacy, is less likely to obtain a positive 
customer response unless there are sufficient customer-seller ties. High value-based 
selling is very effective when the salesperson also engages in high customer advocacy 
and the customer has confidence in the salesperson’s reports of such behavior. However, 
the other side of the coin is that value-based selling can be particularly counterproductive 
for a highly monitored salesperson, if customer advocacy is low. The salesperson’s 
value-based selling efforts may be perceived by the customer as particularly irritating 
when the salesperson’s motive is suspect.  
2.6.2: Managerial Implications 
My research provides some insight into why the feud between sales and 
marketing has been so vicious and longstanding. The fact that salesperson’s customer 
advocacy simultaneously produces both positive and negative effects on the seller firm’s 
net profit means that, in any given situation, an equally valid case may be made for or 
against the need to engage in salesperson’s customer advocacy – in essence, both 
salespeople and marketers are right about their respective positions.  
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Further, in many cases the salesperson’s rationale for engaging in salesperson’s 
customer advocacy is based on weighing opportunity costs that are, by nature, difficult to 
validate retrospectively. If one argues that providing the proposed customization might 
lead to a significant reduction in seller profitability, a counterargument could be 
presented that the reduction to profitability is a more favorable outcome than if the 
customer were to be completely lost to a competitor. Because opinions about the best 
course of action are likely to differ in these circumstances, tensions between parties are 
elevated. My research provides salespeople and seller decision-makers with empirical 
insights into the situations under which the salesperson’s customer advocacy may lead to 
positive outcomes for the seller firm.   
To more fully address this debate, I performed a simple post-hoc analysis 
involving group mean comparisons. A mean-split of the sample reveals that, on average, 
high advocacy generates increased customer-level profit (t = 2.05), that the positive 
effect on sales indeed carries through to the bottom line. I also find that when 
salesperson’s customer advocacy leads to the greatest level of customer-specific 
discounts (i.e., when value-based selling and interfirm ties are high), high customer 
advocacy has a positive effect on sales (t = 2.34) and no effect on profit (t = .73). That is, 
even when the salesperson’s intrafirm actions to advocate for the customer generate the 
greatest level of concessions, the positive effect on sales is strong enough to wash out the 
negative effect on the seller’s customer-level profit. These findings suggest that 
salespeople should in fact err on the side of engaging in high levels of customer advocacy 
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and that seller decision-makers should embrace such salesperson actions.    
By conducting a simultaneous examination of internally- and externally-directed 
salesperson actions, I am able to uncover how the effects of both forms of salesperson 
actions on seller firm decisions and customer behavior are interdependent. These results 
provide guidance to salespeople as they adapt sales strategies in response to changing 
B2B buyer behavior. By acknowledging the salesperson’s dual agency as representative 
of the seller firm and advocate for the customer, and by taking a triadic approach to 
examining the salesperson’s dual role, I offer unique insight into how salespeople must 
adapt not only their sales approach directed externally toward buyers, but also how they 
must adapt their actions directed internally toward seller firm decision-makers. Utilizing 
advanced forms of B2B customer analytics and integrating CRM data, survey data, 
transaction data, activity-based costing data, and other types of objective archival data, I 
offer guidance to managers about ways to improve customer upsell and cross-sell 
opportunities in business markets. By leveraging this unique dataset, I also empirically 
explore how the salesperson’s position as mediator in the buyer-seller network influences 
customer outcomes and I link prior literature on salesperson internal networks to factors 
affecting objective customer performance. 
2.6.3: Limitations and Future Research Directions 
While salespeople engage in customer advocacy in order to seek a wide range of 
outcomes for their customers, in this research I focus solely on price discounting. 
Narrowing my focus to price discounting has several advantages. First, because price 
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discounting has such strong implications for the seller’s financial outcomes, the seller 
maintains highly descriptive logs about past and current prices offered to its customers. 
This allows for very accurate and objective measures of price discounting pertaining to 
the customers in the study. Second, while there are indeed many forms of customization 
that salespeople seek for their customers, price discounting is perhaps the most common. 
Simester and Zhang (2014) cite several examples of B2B companies where pricing 
discounts represent well over half of company sales. The ubiquitous nature of price 
discounting ensures not only that this is an outcome variable of great interest to 
managers, but also that sufficient variation in discounting exists across customers to 
perform my analysis. At the same time, I concede that there are other important outcomes 
of salesperson’s customer advocacy that should be taken into consideration. For example, 
in addition to price discounting, I suggest that future research investigate the effects of 
the salesperson’s internally- and externally-directed actions on other customization 
related to freight, delivery, payment terms, product or service rebates, and the like.   
I conceptualize salesperson’s customer advocacy as an episodic phenomenon 
exhibiting variation (1) between salespeople and (2) between customers and (3) within 
customers (i.e., over time). Based on this conceptualization, I suggest that this construct 
can be measured with increasing precision at the salesperson, salesperson-customer dyad, 
or episode levels (i.e., salesperson-customer dyad over time), respectively. Because my 
research design in Study 1 is cross-sectional, I operationalize salesperson’s customer 
advocacy and value base selling at the salesperson-customer dyad level. I suggest that 
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future research measure both forms of salesperson behavior longitudinally at the 
salesperson-customer dyad level in order to more precisely operationalize these 
constructs and to determine whether the relationship between the salesperson’s internally- 
and externally-directed behavior may change over time. 
2.7: CONCLUSION 
In summary, salesperson’s customer advocacy is a fundamental aspect of the 
salesperson’s role as mediator between the seller firm and the customer. Because extant 
marketing research has failed to account for this important aspect of the salesperson’s 
dual role, this research fills an important gap in the literature. Relying on well-established 
assumptions grounded in agency theory, I offer evidence that the salesperson can allay 
the suspicion of both customers and seller decision-makers by demonstrating allegiance 
to the focal party. In doing so, I demonstrate the importance for researchers and 
practitioners to consider both aspects of the salesperson’s dual role when considering 
frontline issues. The effects of the salesperson’s actions to represent the seller to the 
customer and the customer to the seller are closely intertwined and interrelated, and 
focusing on either form of salesperson action in isolation could lead to inaccurate 
conclusions. My results indicate that salesperson’s customer advocacy has complex 
effects on net profit, increasing discounting as well as customer sales and cross-buying. 
Salesperson’s customer advocacy is a powerful and important tool for the salesperson, 
and I hope this research sparks increased study of this particular aspect of the 
salesperson’s dual role.  
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CHAPTER 3 – THE BRIGHT AND DARK SIDE OF BUYER ADVOCACY: 
EXPLORING ITS ROLE IN BUILDING BUYING CENTER CONSENSUS AND 
INFLUENCING SUPPLIER SALES IN B2B MARKETS 
 
3.1: INTRODUCTION 
According to the 2017 Institute for the Study of Business Markets (ISBM) 
research priorities, understanding the evolution of the B2B buying process is among the 
most pressing issues. This topic is closely related to the third-ranked 2016 – 2018 
Marketing Science Institute (MSI) research priority, “B2B Decision Making.” 
Specifically, MSI asks, “How is the B2B purchase cycle influenced by aspects of joint 
decision-making and committee decision-making? What is the influence of others in such 
joint decision-making? What is the path to purchase and what are the most appropriate 
marketing levers?” Clearly, questions about whether extant knowledge on buying centers 
and B2B buyer behavior is still valid are of extreme importance to both scholars and 
practitioners. Accordingly, in this research I attempt to shed light on these and other 
pertinent questions. I present a new construct, buyer advocacy, defined as efforts by a 
buying center member (buyer) to represent, support and defend a supplier during 
interactions with others within the buying center to achieve consensus such that the 
supplier is positively evaluated. I show how this form of B2B buyer behavior affects the 
supplier’s customer-level outcomes. Specifically, I explore the role buyer advocates play 
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within the buying center and the effect these individuals’ actions ultimately have on the 
supplier’s customer-level sales.  
As the size of buying centers continues to increase, so does the number of 
individuals involved in any given purchasing decision. In a recent study of B2B buying 
centers, Schmidt, Adamson, and Bird (2015) note that an average of 5.4 people now 
formally sign off on purchases in B2B settings and that these members represent a much 
wider variety of jobs, functions, and geographies than ever before. In response, suppliers 
have begun to rely on advocates inside the customer organization to reduce uncertainty 
and establish consensus among buyer decision-makers and stakeholders.  
In this essay, my research questions are:  
1)   How does buyer advocacy affect the supplier’s customer-level sales? 
2) Is buyer advocacy always beneficial for the supplier? Are there conditions under 
which buyer advocacy may actually be counterproductive for the supplier?  
3) What factors moderate the relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s 
customer-level sales?  
I examine buyer advocacy’s impact on the supplier’s customer-level sales and test 
my conceptual model using hierarchical random effects regression analysis of a complex 
dataset compiled from survey and transactional archival data of 1,000+ B2B buyers of a 
collaborating Fortune 500 wholesaler. I test my hypotheses on customer-level sales and, 
capitalizing on a rare data opportunity, provide additional model free evidence of the 
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association between buyer advocacy and a number of other important supplier financial 
outcomes (e.g., net profit).  
My research builds on extant literature examining B2B buyer behavior, making 
several contributions. First, I theoretically justify and offer evidence of a positive effect 
of buyer advocacy on the supplier’s sales, while also providing theoretically grounded 
rationale for a countervailing mechanism, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales. I then take the three-step approach of 
Lind and Mehlum (2010) to empirically validate this relationship. I show that buyer 
advocacy exhibits a strong positive association with the supplier’s customer-level sales, 
but only at low to moderate levels. High levels of buyer advocacy risk drawing suspicion 
from other members of the buying center. I find that, while suppliers should in general 
encourage and enable buyers to advocate on their behalf, there is danger in appearing 
overly optimistic about the supply relationship. This is an important cautionary note for 
supplier reps and buying center members as they seek to gain consensus among the 
various stakeholders within the buying center.   
Second, drawing from cognitive response theory (Greenwald 1968), I propose 
several factors that moderate the inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy 
and the supplier’s customer-level sales. I theorize and find evidence that when a buyer 
advocate places a low to moderate level of trust in the supplier, the way in which the 
buyer advocates for the supplier changes such that buyer advocacy is perceived by others 
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in the buying center as being more balanced and practical, inducing fewer 
counterarguments. Interestingly, I find that when the buyer has low trust in the supplier, a 
“shape-flip” occurs such that the relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s 
sales is instead convex or U-shaped. Further, per the cognitive response model, I propose 
additional factors that reduce counterarguments to the buyer advocate’s message are (a) 
communicator expertise (i.e., buyer education and industry experience) and (b) 
circumstances that affect message recipients’ ability to form counterarguments (i.e., 
customer firm-supplier relationship dynamism and relationship length). I find that buyer 
expertise indeed magnifies buyer advocacy’s effect on the supplier’s sales as do factors 
that hinder the ability of others within the buying center to form counterarguments. By 
carefully explicating how the proposed moderators affect either the underlying linear or 
nonlinear mechanism, I provide a fine-grained analysis of the phenomena under study 
which lends strong support for my theory-based rationale.  
  Third, by examining variables that are readily available and familiar to most 
B2B practitioners, I provide managerially actionable insights. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I first discuss the theoretical 
foundations of my research, followed by my conceptual model and research hypotheses. 
Next, I describe the data, measures, and hierarchical regression model used to test my 
hypotheses. Finally, I discuss my results, offer managerial implications, note limitations, 
and provide directions for future research. 
70 
 
3.2: THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1: Buyer Advocates Inside Today’s B2B Buying Center  
Scholars have been conducting research on B2B buying centers for over 40 years, 
and while a vast literature has resulted, management of the organizational buying center 
has been noted as “one of the fastest-changing aspects of contemporary business and 
marketing” (Johnston and Chandler 2012). Sheth’s (1973) foundational article 
established a model of organizational buyer behavior which captured the fundamental 
processes underlying behavior within B2B buying centers. The model is composed of 
three aspects: (1) the psychological world of the individuals involved in organizational 
buying decisions, (2) the conditions which precipitate joint decisions among these 
individuals, and (3) the process of joint decision making among decision makers. Sheth’s 
model was developed during a time when buying centers were far less complex. Today, it 
goes without saying that nearly all B2B purchasing decisions are conducted jointly, with 
a vast array of individuals staking a claim, including: company executives, heads of HR, 
a range of end users, influencers, third-party consultants, and even potential partners 
(Adamson et al. 2015). The boundary of what constitutes a buying center has expanded 
to include: (1) gatekeepers, or those who control information flows, (2) influencers, those 
who supply technical specifications, (3) deciders, those who choose the product or 
service, (4) buyers, those who have formal authority to conduct transactions and submit 
purchases, and (5) users, those who actually put the product or service to use. Truly, 
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nearly anyone in the customer organization could be considered a member of the buying 
center, depending on the organization’s specific procurement processes.     
The most common B2B buying center model involves assigning specific buyers 
responsibility for managing relationships with specific suppliers. This works to facilitate 
relationship development, the ability to monitor buyer and supplier performance, and the 
ability to maintain a more efficient system of accountability. The buyer assigned to a 
specific supplier then acts as the “point person” or mediator between the supplier and the 
rest of the stakeholders in the buying center. This buyer is generally the most 
knowledgeable about the specific supplier and interacts most frequently with members of 
the supplier organization. Therefore, when a buyer advocate emerges, it is most often the 
person formally assigned to the focal supplier. Supporting this notion, Martilla (1971) 
argues that there are opinion leaders within industrial organizations who “are exposed 
to…sources of information more frequently and in greater depth than those whom they 
counsel.” Therefore, though not always the case, buyer advocates tend to be those 
individuals within the buying center with formal responsibility to maintain the supply 
relationship and have the most interpersonal contact with supplier representatives.  
3.2.2: Buyer Advocate: Representative, Supporter, and Defender 
 Buyer advocacy is defined as efforts by a buying center member to represent, 
support and defend a supplier during interactions with others within the buying center. 
Therefore, while advocating for the supplier, the buyer takes on one or more of three 
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roles: supplier representative, supplier supporter, and supplier defender. First, with 
respect to a buyer advocate’s representative role, when others within the customer firm 
are looking to source items that the buyer knows the supplier carries, the buyer advocate 
recommends the supplier. In this way, the buyer advocate acts as a supplier 
representative, an extension of the supplier firm, when a supplier rep such as a 
salesperson is not present, and communicates positive messages about the supplier to 
others within the buying center. Having a representative within the buying center allows 
the supplier unprecedented access to all members of the buying center, something that 
would be difficult, if not impossible, without the collaboration of the buyer advocate. As 
supplier representative, the buyer advocate may direct messaging to any member of the 
buying center; she may inform a gatekeeper to allow the salesperson to make visits to the 
customer location, she may discuss technical specifications of the supplier’s offering with 
influencers and users to gain buy-in, or she may informally drop in a good word for the 
supplier with deciders or buyers. Acting as representative of the supplier within the 
customer firm, the buyer advocate is uniquely positioned to gain consensus among the 
diverse members of the buying center.  
Second, buyer advocates are supporters of the supplier to decision-makers within 
their organization. In this role, buyer advocates focus their messaging specifically to 
deciders and buyers within the buying center. The advocate seeks to influence both the 
person who chooses the product and the person with the formal authority to place orders. 
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He may do so directly by communicating information to these colleagues, or indirectly by 
feeding the supplier information about the customer firm’s internal decision-making 
process, the sequence and timing of decisions to be made, or any additional information 
that would be helpful to overcome objections. Acting as supporter during the decision-
making process, the buyer is an invaluable partner, especially during the later stages of 
the buying process when key decisions about supplier selection are made.   
Third, the buyer advocate is a defender of the supplier to others within the buying 
center. In this way, the buyer advocate at times takes personal risks to vouch for the 
supplier. Schmidt, Adamson, and Bird (2015) note that buyer advocates take risks that 
are inherent to fighting for change and promoting consensus. Such risks include “losing 
respect or credibility in their organization if they push for an unpopular purchase or are 
unable to attract support, or if the purchase they backed turns out to be unwise.” The 
authors further note that the decision to publicly defend the supplier may be driven by the 
buyer’s belief that the value provided by the supplier is greater than the potential cost, or 
that the supplier is trustworthy to follow through on the buyer’s promises or to make 
amends for occasional service failures.3  
In each of the three roles, the buyer advocate seeks to reduce uncertainty among 
buying center colleagues to build confidence in the supplier and, ultimately, achieve 
                                                          
3 While the antecedents to buyer advocacy are intriguing and managerially relevant, I set aside the 
examination of such factors as avenues for future research and instead focus on the consequences of buyer 
advocacy in this study. 
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consensus among the various members of the buying center such that the supplier is 
positively evaluated.  
3.2.3: Cognitive Response Theory 
The cognitive response model of persuasion attributes the most direct cause of 
persuasion to the “self-talk” of the persuasion target, rather than the content of the 
message (Kenrick, Neuber, and Cialdini 2009). Research supporting the model shows 
that persuasion is affected by the amount of self-talk that occurs in response to a 
message. Cognitive response theory postulates, “when a person receives a 
communication and is faced with the decision of accepting or rejecting the persuasion, he 
may be expected to attempt to relate the new information to his existing attitudes, 
knowledge, feelings, etc.” (Greenwald 1968). In so doing, the person may actually 
encounter and process information that is not in the message itself. Any additional self-
generated cognitions may agree with the proposals of the communicator, disagree, or be 
entirely neutral. To the extent that the communicator evokes responses that are in 
agreement with the message, the subject will tend to agree with the communicator, and 
vice versa.  
Accordingly, the cognitive response model suggests that communicators seeking 
to persuade a message recipient should focus on factors that are likely to produce or 
constrain counterarguments, negative cognitive responses that prohibit persuasion 
(Greenwald 1968), as “the impact of the message may well be reduced if message 
recipients counterattack it with their own arguments” (Brock, Ostrom and Petty 1981, 
75 
 
p.14). Among others, the model suggests factors that reduce counterarguments include 
communicator expertise and circumstances that inhibit message recipients’ ability to 
formulate counterarguments (Eagly and Chaiken 1993).  
3.2.4: Theorizing U-shaped Relationships 
 According to Haans et al. (2016), “an inverted U-shaped relationship exists if Y 
first increases with X at a decreasing rate to reach a maximum, after which Y decreases at 
an increasing rate.” Perhaps the most common way a U-shaped relationship is 
conceptualized is as two latent functions (i.e., two countervailing forces) jointly 
contributing to the U-shape. For example, an inverted U-shaped relationship may result 
from the additive combination of an underlying positive linear relationship between a 
focal variable and a mediator (e.g., a benefit), and a convex or exponential relationship 
between the focal variable and a second mediator (e.g., a cost), with each mediator 
having an opposite effect on the distal outcome of interest. Such an additive combination 
is illustrated in Figure 3.1. In this case, one might argue that while benefits to the 
outcome variable increase linearly with increases to the independent variable, costs tend 
to escalate rapidly (Haans et al. 2016). Subtracting costs from the benefits results in an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the independent variable and the focal outcome 
variable. This can be demonstrated algebraically as follows: 
(1) A = a0 + a1x 
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(2) B = b0 + b1x + b2x2 
(3) Y = A – B = (a0 – b0) + (a1 – b1)x – b2x2  
where Equation 1 represents the linear benefit function, Equation 2 represents the convex 
cost function, and Equation 3 represents the resulting inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the focal independent variable (x) and the focal outcome (Y).    
Figure 3.1: Additive combination of latent mechanisms resulting in an inverted U-shaped 
relationship (Reproduced from Haans et al. 2016) 
 
    A       B    Y 
 
A = latent linear mechanism 
B = latent convex or exponential mechanism 
Y = inverted U-shaped relationship between focal variable and distal outcome of interest 
Corresponding algebraical representation: 
A = a0 + a1x 
B = b0 + b1x + b2x
2 
Y = A – B = (a0 – b0) + (a1 – b1)x – b2x2  
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3.2.5: Establishing Moderation of U-shaped Relationships 
 Moderation of a U-shaped relationship between a focal independent variable (x) 
and a focal outcome variable (Y) occurs when a moderating variable (z) affects one or 
both of the underlying latent mechanisms (Equation 1, Equation 2, or both). Extending 
Equation 3 to include moderator z results in the following: 
(4) Y = c0 + c1x + c2x2 + c3z + c4xz + c5x2z 
In Equation 4, moderation of a U-shaped relationship is present when either c4 or c5 is 
significantly different from zero. Changes in the level of the moderating variable may 
result in a horizontal shift of the turning point along the x-axis (i.e., when c4 is 
significant), a flattening or steepening of the curve (i.e., when c5 is significant), or both 
(i.e., when c4 and c5 are both significant). Therefore, a moderating variable can be 
theorized to affect the underlying linear mechanism, the underlying nonlinear 
mechanism, or both, depending on the specific circumstances at hand. To illustrate how a 
horizontal shift in the turning point of the U-shaped relationship results when c4 is 
significant, consider the case where z moderates only the theorized underlying linear 
benefit function:  
(5) A = a0 + (a1 + z)x; 
and the convex cost function is unchanged: 
(6) B = b0 + b1x + b2x2. 
Subtracting Equation 6 from Equation 5 results in the following: 
(7) Y = A – B = (a0 – b0) + (a1 – b1 + z)x – b2x2. 
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Taking the first derivative of Equation 7 with respect to x and setting it equal to zero 
results in: 
(8) x* = (a1 – b1 + z) / (2b2).   
Equation 8 indicates how the turning point depends on the moderator (z). A unique 
turning point exists for each value of z such that if z is positive, the turning point shifts to 
the right, and if z is negative, the turning point shifts to the left. In this example, z does 
not affect x2 so the curvature of the U-shaped relationship does not change (i.e., no 
steepening or flattening; Haans et al. 2016). One can easily extend equations 5 – 8 to 
include moderation of the underlying nonlinear mechanism (i.e., higher-order interaction 
x2z), in which case the curvature of the U-shaped relationship would depend on z. 
Referring again to Equation 4, a significant c4 would support the rationale that the latent 
linear mechanism is strengthened or weakened by the moderator, while a significant c5 
would support the rationale the that curvilinearity of the latent nonlinear mechanism is 
strengthened or weakened by the moderator.   
3.3: CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT  
3.3.1: Theorizing an Inverted U-shaped Relationship between Buyer Advocacy and the 
Supplier’s Customer-level Sales 
 Figure 3.2 summarizes my conceptual model of the effects of buyer advocacy on 
the supplier’s customer-level sales. As mentioned, the primary goal of buyer advocacy is 
to positively affect the opinions of others within the buying center such that the supplier’s 
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standing is improved or maintained. The process involves reducing uncertainty, building 
confidence and, ultimately, achieving consensus among the various members of the 
buying center such that the supplier is positively evaluated. Buyer advocacy generates 
positive messaging in support of the supplier within the buying center which further 
enhances expected quality (Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014; Kumar, Peterson, and Leone 
2013) and reduces perceived risk (Vazques-Casielles, Suarez-Alvarez, and del Rio-Lanza 
2013), positively influencing the buying center’s decision to purchase from the supplier.  
 On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that a countervailing mechanism 
may also be present; that at high levels, buyer advocacy may also produce negative 
outcomes. In general, members of B2B channel relationships (i.e., manufacturers, 
wholesalers, resellers, end-users) compete to maximize their share of the total value pie 
(Fang, Palmatier and Evans 2008). While it is true that value-adding partnerships among 
channel members can, in some cases, enhance the overall size of the value pie (Tescari 
and Brito 2016), in most B2B markets cost of production and retail pricing are fixed and 
together determine the total profit pie to be distributed among channel members. The 
result is a zero-sum, competitive game (Cachon and Netessine 2004). Channel members 
therefore attempt to maneuver and position themselves relative to other members such 
that they maximize their share of the total pie, according to well-established rules of 
power and interdependence (Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1998).  
 
80 
 
81 
 
Therefore, even though channel members can and do benefit from forging strong 
bonds, channel members strive to remain objective and resist becoming enamored or 
enthralled by any given partner, because doing so creates conditions of vulnerability that 
allow a channel partner to act opportunistically (Anderson and Jap 2005). Gundlach and 
Cannon (2009) explain that when a customer is overly optimistic in its evaluation of a 
supplier, “the supplier may take advantage…and shirk on promises to deliver product on 
time, provide quality that meets expectations, charge ‘market’ prices, or keep agreed 
upon service obligations.” Grant and Schwartz (2011) explain that, “at moderate levels, 
optimism provides confidence and increased planning, but very high optimism leads to 
inadequate preparation and the underestimation of risks.” Further, Haaga and Stewart 
(1992) note that optimism “can be too extreme, leading to inappropriate complacency.” 
Indeed, optimism bias is “one of the most consistent, prevalent, and robust biases 
documented in psychology and behavioral economics” and manifests when individuals 
overestimate the likelihood of positive events and underestimate the likelihood of 
negative events (Sharot 2011, p.1). The stakes are clearly raised when actors are involved 
in competitive endeavors, making optimism bias particularly destructive in business 
contexts. B2B customers therefore adopt a philosophy of “trust but verify” with respect 
to their suppliers (Gundlach and Cannon 2009), employing various checks and balances 
as safeguards to maintain objective and realistic perspectives of channel partners.  
The growth in size of today’s B2B buying centers has been recognized as a direct 
result of such safeguarding efforts. Adamson et al. (2015, p.5) assert that the number one 
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reason for the added number of individuals involved in the B2B buying process today is 
“a sustained and widespread aversion to risk among both individual customer 
stakeholders and organizations.” Collaborative decision-making distributes buying 
authority, capitalizing on a broader bank of knowledge, consideration of a greater number 
of alternatives and diverse decision-making processes, together mitigating the risk of 
cognitive bias at the individual level (Osmani 2016). By adding more and differing 
perspectives to the purchasing decision process, customers hedge against risk that the 
cognitive biases of any single decision maker present a point of weakness. 
For these reasons, buying center members must walk a fine line when advocating 
for a supplier. Those that overly advocate run the risk of appearing overly optimistic 
about a competitive channel member, signaling potential optimism bias. As members of 
the buying center process a buyer advocate’s message, they evaluate the advocate’s level 
of optimism and objectivity toward the supplier to determine whether the advocate’s 
judgement may be compromised or clouded. Buying center members who overly 
advocate for a supplier risk raising suspicion about the reliability of the buyer advocate’s 
message. 
According to the cognitive response model, the degree to which a target of 
communication accepts a message depends on the amount of counterarguments that the 
target generates in response to a message (Brock, Ostrom and Petty 1981). As buying 
center members become increasingly suspicious of the reliability of the buyer advocate’s 
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message, they form more counterarguments. I therefore expect that the degree to which 
buying center members form counterarguments to the buyer advocate’s message 
increases rapidly with increasing advocacy, manifesting as a convex relationship. 
Combining the expected positive linear mechanism and the convex negative mechanism 
underlying the effects of buyer advocacy on the supplier’s sales results in an inverted U-
shaped relationship.4 I therefore hypothesize: 
H1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the 
supplier’s customer-level sales. 
3.3.2: The Moderating Role of Buyer Trust in the Supplier 
I expect that as a buyer advocate signals greater objectivity regarding its 
evaluation of the supplier, the underlying nonlinear relationship between buyer advocacy 
and buying center member suspicion is attenuated. One such way a buying center 
member signals objectivity is by tempering the degree to which it trusts the supplier 
(Gundlach and Cannon 2009; Anderson and Jap 2005). When the buyer advocate 
maintains a low to moderate level of trust in the supplier, others in the buying center are 
likely to discern this and, in turn, its advocacy for the supplier is perceived as more 
balanced and practical. When the buyer advocate is perceived as more objective and 
presenting a more balanced message, buying center members are less likely to form 
                                                          
4 Referring again to Figure 3.1, the theorized positive effects of buyer advocacy (i.e., consensus generation) 
on the supplier’s customer-level sales is illustrated by plot A, while the theorized costs of buyer advocacy 
(i.e., buying center members’ suspicion or perceived risk) are illustrated by plot B. 
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suspicions which produce counterarguments. Therefore, I expect that the relationship 
between buyer advocacy and buying center member suspicion is attenuated as the buyer 
is less trusting of the supplier. Because buyer trust in the supplier is theorized to have no 
effect on the underlying linear mechanism, but is rather expected to enhance the 
underlying nonlinear countervailing mechanism, I expect a steepening (flattening) of the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-
level sales as the buyer’s trust in the supplier increases (decreases). Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following: 
H2: The inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales 
is stronger (weaker) when the buyer advocate is more (less) trusting of the supplier.   
Moderation such as that hypothesized in H2 involving a strengthening or 
weakening of the nonlinear latent mechanism is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of moderation of the latent linear mechanism (H2) 
 A          B      Y 
 
*The dotted line illustrates the shift caused by moderation of the underlying nonlinear 
mechanism, with no effect to the underlying linear mechanism (Reproduced from Haans 
et al. 2016). 
A = latent linear mechanism 
B = latent convex or exponential mechanism 
Y = inverted U-shaped relationship between focal variable and distal outcome of interest 
Corresponding algebraical representation: 
Y = c0 + c1x + c2x
2 + c3z + c4xz + c5x
2z; 
where c5 is significantly different than zero and c4 is not. 
 
3.3.3: The Moderating Role of Communicator Expertise 
Following Martilla (1971), I make the general assumption that organizational 
opinion leaders are perceived by others as having superior knowledge and expertise about 
the focal topic. In the context of buyer advocacy, this means that the buyer advocate, in 
general, holds a higher base level of perceived expertise regarding issues pertaining to the 
supplier relative to the other members of the buying center. Nevertheless, the buyer 
advocate may be viewed as having more or less expertise depending on her direct training 
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(e.g., industry experience) and indirect training (e.g., education). Because a high level of 
communicator expertise has been shown to constrain counterarguments (Greenwald 
1968), thereby enhancing the degree to which the target of the communication accepts the 
message, I expect that buyer advocacy is more effective at gaining consensus among the 
members of the buying center when the buyer advocate has more (a) education and (b) 
industry experience. Because buyer expertise is theorized to enhance the positive effect 
of buyer advocacy on the generation of consensus within the buying center (i.e., 
enhancing the underlying linear mechanism), and not necessarily the rate at which high 
levels of buyer advocacy produce suspicion among other members of the buying center 
(i.e., no theorized effect on the underlying nonlinear countervailing mechanism), I expect 
a rightward shift of the inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the 
supplier’s customer-level sales as the buyer’s expertise increases. Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following: 
H3: Peak customer-level sales will occur at higher levels of buyer advocacy when the 
buyer has more direct expertise (i.e., more industry experience);  
H4: Peak customer-level sales will occur at higher levels of buyer advocacy when the 
buyer has more indirect expertise (i.e. more education).  
2.3.4: The Moderating Role of Customer Firm-Supplier Relationship Dynamism and 
Relationship Length 
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In addition, cognitive response theory predicts that as message recipients 
experience insufficient time or ability to process messaging, they are inhibited from 
developing counterarguments to a persuasive message (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). This is 
closely related to the well-established notion that cognitive resources are finite and are 
depleted as individuals attempt to process increasing amounts of information, or 
increasingly complex forms of information (Franconeri, Alvarez and Cavanagh 2013). 
Gutnik et al. (2006) state that, “high stress situations necessitate immediate response 
behavior, and perceptual cues may play a more prominent role in the decision process.” 
Likewise, Kumkale, Albarracin, and Seignourel (2010) explain that increased information 
processing results in nonelaborative processing and a deferral to external sources. 
Therefore, other members of the buying center are more likely to defer to the buyer 
advocate in the presence of high levels of complexity or cognitive strain, and are less 
likely to invest cognitive resources to develop counterarguments. Increased complexity 
and cognitive strain are likely to develop in dynamic environments. Therefore, when the 
customer firm-supplier relationship is more dynamic, e.g., when the customer’s 
requirements or needs of the supplier frequently change, buying center members will 
experience a greater degree of complexity in the decision-making process, inhibiting their 
ability to develop counterarguments to the buyer advocate’s message. Therefore, I expect 
that as customer firm-supplier relationship dynamism increases, the role of buyer 
advocacy becomes more critical and more effective at generating consensus within the 
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buying center. Because customer firm-supplier relationship dynamism is theorized to 
enhance the positive effect of buyer advocacy on the generation of consensus within the 
buying center (i.e., enhancing the underlying linear mechanism), and not necessarily the 
rate at which high levels of buyer advocacy produce suspicion among other members of 
the buying center (i.e., no theorized effect on the underlying nonlinear countervailing 
mechanism), I expect a rightward shift of the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-level sales with increasing relationship 
dynamism. Therefore, in line with cognitive response theory, I hypothesize the following: 
H5: Peak customer-level sales will occur at higher levels of buyer advocacy when there is 
more variability in what the customer firm requires of the supplier (i.e., greater customer 
firm-supplier relationship dynamism).   
Just as cognitive response theory predicts that a decision maker’s ability to form 
counterarguments is hindered by exposure to high levels of information and/or 
complexity, the model also predicts a similar outcome when decision makers face an 
absence of pertinent information (Eppler and Mengis 2004; Tushman and Nadler 1978). 
Kowert (2012, p.81) suggests that managers increasingly “rely on expert intuition in the 
face of doubt or uncertainty.” Accordingly, Kumkale, Albarracin, and Seignourel (2010) 
note that when decision makers have established opinions about a topic formed on prior 
experience, those opinions are likely to provide readily available bases for a current 
evaluation of the topic. Therefore, when members of the buying center have greater 
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information from prior experience with a supplier, they (a) should have increased ability 
to develop counterarguments to the buyer advocate’s message, and (b) be less likely to 
rely on information offered by the buyer advocate when arriving at a decision, as prior 
attitudes and knowledge about a topic are generally perceived as being more valid than 
information received from an external source (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio 2000). 
Therefore, I expect there to be a negative relationship between the effectiveness of buyer 
advocacy at generating consensus within the buying center and customer firm-supplier 
relationship length. Because customer firm-supplier relationship length is theorized to 
diminish the positive effect of buyer advocacy on the generation of consensus within the 
buying center (i.e., attenuating the underlying linear mechanism), and not necessarily 
affecting the rate at which high levels of buyer advocacy produce suspicion among other 
members of the buying center (i.e., no theorized effect on the underlying nonlinear 
countervailing mechanism), I expect a leftward shift of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-level sales as customer 
firm-supplier relationship length increases. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H6: Peak customer-level sales will occur at higher levels of buyer advocacy when the 
customer firm-supplier relationship length is shorter. 
Moderation such as that hypothesized in H3 – H6 involving a strengthening or 
weakening of the linear latent mechanism is illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of moderation of the latent linear mechanism (H3 – H6)  
 A            B                  Y 
 
*The dotted line illustrates the shift caused by moderation of the underlying linear 
mechanism, with no effect to the underlying nonlinear mechanism (Reproduced from 
Haans et al. 2016). 
A = latent linear mechanism 
B = latent convex or exponential mechanism 
Y = inverted U-shaped relationship between focal variable and distal outcome of interest 
Corresponding algebraic representation: 
Y = c0 + c1x + c2x
2 + c3z + c4xz + c5x
2z; 
where c4 is significantly different than zero and c5 is not. 
3.3.5: The Moderating Role of Buying Center Size 
Scholars have stressed the importance of gaining a clearer understanding of the 
influence of buying center characteristics such as group size and structure (Johnston and 
Chandler 2012). Therefore, the question of whether buyer advocacy is more or less 
effective when conducted in smaller or larger buying centers is an important one, 
especially considering the wide diversity of buying centers across firms. On the one 
hand, buyer advocacy may become increasingly critical as the size of the buying center 
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grows, because consensus among buying center members becomes increasingly difficult 
to obtain with each addition to the buying center, because with each addition there is a 
greater probablility of encountering a dissenting opinion. In support of this position, 
Schmidt, Adamson and Bird (2015) claim anecdotally that the likelihood of a purchase 
drops sharply as the number of decision makers in the buying center increases. This line 
of reasoning would support the notion that buying center size positively moderates the 
relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales. 
On the other hand, as the size of the buying center grows, buying center members 
may find it increasingly difficult to advocate in a way that appeals to the diverse 
perspectives of each additional member of the buying center, reducing the effectiveness 
of buyer advocacy. Buyer advocates are time-constrained and may be unable to 
communicate to all members of the buying center, depending on the count and 
geographic dispersion of the various members. As neither process considered is more 
compelling than the other, I offer no hypothesis and examine the moderating effect of 
buying center size as an empirical question.  
3.4 METHOD 
3.4.1: Data Acquisition 
The dataset was compiled through collaboration with a Fortune 500 wholesaler 
headquartered in the United States. This B2B supplier serves a large, diverse portfolio of 
reseller customers that operate in numerous industries. The firm provides an ideal context 
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in which to test my model as the customers associated with this firm show significant 
variation in supplier financial outcomes and buying center size (median = 5 individuals). 
My dataset consists of data from a survey of buyers coupled with secondary data from the 
partner’s archival databases. 
When dealing with this supplier firm, each B2B customer is represented by a 
buying center member who manages the relationship vis-à-vis this supplier. A link to the 
survey was emailed to the buyer for each of the supplier’s ~20,000 customers, followed 
by two subsequent reminders each separated by one week. I received close to 1,300 
responses to the items under study during the 2-week response period, for a response rate 
of approximately 7%. Where multiple respondents from the same customer firm 
responded, one respondent from each customer firm was chosen at random to be included 
in the study. Further, respondents indicating having “no impact” on purchases from the 
collaborating supplier and those failing attention checks were subsequently dropped, 
leaving a final sample of 1,014 customers. The sample is very representative of the 
supplier’s customer portfolio, with the percentage of each industry in the sample falling 
within six percentage points of that industry’s share of all the supplier’s customers.  
3.4.2: Measurement 
I adapted published scales when appropriate and developed new measures when 
necessary. Reflective measures were used to operationalize the focal constructs in the 
study. Details are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Buyer advocacy. Being the first to empirically examine the construct of buyer 
advocacy (BuyerAdvoc), I sought to ensure that the three core dimensions of buyer 
advocacy were well represented. To capture the buyer’s role as supplier representative, I 
developed the item, “When others within my company are looking to source items that I 
know [this supplier] offers, I am quick to recommend [this supplier].” This item reflects 
the degree to which the buyer represents the supplier, acting as an extension of the 
supplier organization when a supplier representative is not present. Further, by 
recommending the supplier, the buyer voices approval of the supplier resulting in positive 
messaging. This wording of this item ensures that the target of the communication is left 
open to broadly include any member of the buying center.    
To capture the buyer’s role as supplier supporter during the decision making 
process, I developed the item, “I am a supporter of [this supplier] to decision makers 
within my company.” This item reflects the buyer’s willingness to influence members of 
the buying center who choose the product and those with the formal authority to place 
orders. This measure leaves room for both direct and indirect forms of communication to 
decision making stakeholders. 
The buyer’s role as supplier defender is captured with the item, “If [this supplier] 
makes a mistake, I am quick to defend [this supplier] to others within my company.” This 
item reflects the buyer’s willingness to step out and take personal risks to vouch for the 
supplier (Schmidt, Adamson and Bird 2015). By defending the supplier following a 
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service failure, the buyer takes the risk of losing respect or credibility should failures 
recur in the future.  
Finally, I included the item, “I am an advocate for [this supplier] within my 
company,” as a global measure broadly reflecting the construct.   
In summary, I developed the buyer advocacy scale to consist of four items that 
reflect the buyer’s role as representative, supporter, and defender of the supplier, while 
including a fourth global item.  
Other variables drawn from the survey. I measure buyer trust in the supplier 
(Trust) with a single item adapted from Palmatier et al. (2008). Because buyer trust in the 
supplier is expected to be highly correlated with buyer advocacy (ρ = .65 in my sample), 
I remove the shared variance between the two constructs by orthogonalizing buyer trust 
in the supplier (Liu, Sercu, and Vandebroek 2015).5 To operationalize the buyer’s 
expertise, I focus on both formal and informal types of expertise, namely education and 
industry experience, respectively. Each buyer reported its years of industry experience 
(IndExp) and level of education (Educ). Additionally, each buyer informed about the 
customer firm-supplier relationship length (RelLength), customer firm-supplier 
relationship dynamism (RelDynamism) and the size of the buying center within the 
customer firm (BCSize).  
                                                          
5 I regress buyer trust in the supplier on buyer advocacy and take the predicted error terms from the first-
stage equation (Liu, Sercu, and Vandebroek 2015). 
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Control variables. I include two important control variables. Each buyer reported 
its degree of autonomy, or felt ability to determine the nature of its role and make 
decisions on its own (Autonomy), adapted from Wang and Netemeyer (2002). Buyer 
autonomy is an important control variable accounting for the fact that buyers with total 
autonomy may have complete authority to purchase from the supplier. With extreme 
autonomy, buyer advocacy may become completely unnecessary as the buyer would 
effectively serve as the sole decision maker regarding purchases from the supplier. With 
the inclusion of buyer autonomy to the model, I am able to control for this potential 
issue.6  
Each buyer also reported the number of employees within the customer firm, 
reflecting customer firm size (CustSize). Controlling for customer size is important for a 
number of reasons. Customers of different sizes are known to have many other 
differential characteristics that may have the potential to confound my results. Moreover, 
I control for customer size in order to ensure that my measure of buying center size is not 
simply serving as a proxy for customer size, as larger customers would naturally be 
expected to have larger buying centers. By including customer size as a control variable, 
I am able to isolate variation in buying center size while holding constant the overall size 
the customer firm. 
                                                          
6 This issue is also partially addressed by the inclusion of the measure of buying center size. Buyer 
advocacy would also be unnecessary in a buying center of size = 1.   
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Variables from supplier databases. The supplier’s customer-level sales are drawn 
from the supplier’s transaction database and are captured by the natural logarithm of the 
total sales dollars for each customer during the three months following the survey 
(lnSales).  
3.4.3: Measurement Model 
I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the multi-item survey measures. The 
measurement fit indices are: χ2(13)=35.76, comparative fit index (CFI) = .99, Tucker-
Lewis index (TLI) = .99, indicating that the model fits the data well (Bagozzi and Yi 
2012; Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). As indicated in Table 3.2, Cronbach’s alphas range 
from .84 to .92, indicating acceptable reliability for each scale. Convergent and 
discriminant validity is obtained, as all factor loadings’ t-statistics meet the Hatcher 
(1994) criterion and the average variance extracted statistics were between .67 and .74 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
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3.4.4: Model-Free Evidence Demonstrating the Relevance of Buyer Advocacy 
 As a first step, I present model-free evidence demonstrating the economic 
significance of buyer advocacy to the supplier with respect to several highly relevant 
outcomes. I begin by grouping customers reporting buyer advocacy at greater than one 
standard deviation above the mean (i.e., those reporting a high level of buyer advocacy) 
and grouping customers reporting buyer advocacy at greater than one standard deviation 
below the mean (i.e., those reporting a low level of buyer advocacy). I then perform 
mean comparisons of several key financial outcomes of interest to suppliers in this 
industry between the two customer groups. Specifically, I compare mean differences in 
sales dollars, gross margin dollars, net profit dollars, gross margin percent (gross margin 
dollars / sales dollars), net profit percent (net profit dollars / sales dollars), cross-buying 
(count of unique items purchased), and average order size (sales dollars / number of 
orders placed) during the three months following the survey.  
Figure 3.5: Histogram of Buyer Advocacy (range = 1 - 7) 
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Figure 3.5 depicts a histogram of the distribution of buyer advocacy with an observed 
range between one and seven (on a seven-point scale). Table 3.2 presents summary and 
reliability statistics and for all variables, and Table 3.3 provides the results of the mean 
comparison t-tests.  
Table 3.3: Mean Differences between Customer Groups with High and Low Buyer 
Advocacy  
 
  Low Buyer Advocacy  High Buyer Advocacy  
  Obs. Mean S.E.  Obs. Mean S.E. Mean Diff. 
Sales $  135 9,397 1,930  173 24,819 3,337 15,421** 
Gross Margin $  135 2,154 436  173 5,084 653 2,930** 
Net Margin $  135 716 170  173 1,481 212 766** 
Gross Margin %  135 13.72 .88  173 15.97 .66 2.25* 
Net Margin %  135 1.34 .25  173 2.11 .26 .77* 
Cross-Buying  135 50 9  173 110 14 60** 
Average Order Size  135 384 41  173 616 49 232** 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01  
 
 Customers in the high buyer advocacy group on average exhibit greater sales (t = 
3.72), gross margin dollars (t = 3.51), net profit dollars (t = 2.70), gross margin percent (t 
= 2.08), net margin percent (t = 2.11), cross-buying (3.42), and average order size (t = 
3.49). Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, customers in the high 
buyer advocacy group are associated with greater sales for the supplier, and the greater 
sales appears to be driven by both a greater breadth of items purchased (greater customer 
cross-buying) and higher average order amounts. Both of these outcomes are very 
positive for the supplier as they reflect the average breadth and depth of customer 
purchasing. Further, customers in the high buyer advocacy group are also more profitable 
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for the supplier, both in real dollar terms and as a percent of sales. The increased 
profitability is apparent at both the gross and net margin levels indicating that customers 
in the high buyer advocacy group exhibit a higher willingness to pay and/or purchase 
higher-margin items (increased spread between price and costs-of-goods sold), and are 
less costly to serve (decreased customer-level operating expenses).  
3.4.5: Model Specification for Hypothesis Testing 
The multilevel data set contains survey and archival data for 1,014 customers 
assigned to 69 salespeople. In order to account for the nesting structure of the data 
(customers nested within salespeople), I conduct hierarchical random effects regression. 
Though factors related to specific customer-salesperson dyads are beyond the scope of 
this paper, because buyers interact with supplier sales representatives to varying degrees, 
and because these potential relationships or individual salesperson characteristics could 
confound the results of my analysis or violate key assumptions (i.e., independence of the 
error term), I estimate a random effect at the salesperson level to capture and control for 
any salesperson-specific heterogeneity.7  
The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of sales generated from customer i 
associated with salesperson j (lnSalesij). The substantive regressors are: buyer’s advocacy 
(BuyerAdvocij), buyer’s trust in the supplier (Trustij), buyer’s industry experience 
(IndExpij), buyer’s level of education (Educij), customer firm-supplier relationship 
                                                          
7 A second study could explore customer-salesperson dyadic factors, such as any potential effect of 
salesperson’s customer advocacy (e.g., a response surface analysis). 
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dynamism (RelDynamismij), customer firm-supplier relationship length (RelLengthij), and 
buying center size (BCSizeij). The latter six substantive regressors are represented in 
Equation 9 by the vector Regressors. Customer size (CustSizeij) and buyer’s degree of 
autonomy (Autonomyij) are control variables, represented in Equation 9 by the vector 
Control. All explanatory variables are mean-centered and standardized to aid in 
interpretation (Aiken and West 1991; Echambadi and Hess 2007; Gelman 2008). The 
hierarchical regression model is specified as follows:  
(9) lnSalesij = α0 + α1BuyerAdvocij + α2BuyerAdvoc2ij + ∑ α6𝑚=1 2+mRegressorsij  
+ ∑ α6𝑛=1 8+nBuyerAdvocij * Regressorsij + ∑ α
6
𝑝=1 14+pBuyerAdvoc
2
ij * Regressorsij  
+ ∑ α2𝑞=1 20+qControlij + sj + εij; 
where sj is the salesperson-specific random error capturing unobserved salesperson-level 
heterogeneity and εij is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are estimated with 
the Huber-White robust variance estimator to mitigate potential heteroscedasticity (Huber 
1967; White 1980). Variance inflation factors are all below two, well under the 
recommended threshold of five (O’Brien 2007), suggesting multicollinearity is not a 
concern. Table 3.4 summarizes parameter estimates. 
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Table 3.4: Equation 9 Parameter Estimates 
 lnSales 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Buyer Advocacy (BuyerAdvoc) .12 (.11) 
BuyerAdvoc2 -.26** (.08) 
Buyer Trust in the Supplier (Trust) .20 (.12) 
BuyerAdvoc * Trust -.23 (.13) 
BuyerAdvoc2 * Trust -.13* (.06) 
Buyer’s Industry Experience (IndExp) -.22* (.10) 
BuyerAdvoc * IndExp .24* (.10) 
Buyer’s Level of Education (Educ) .00 (.10) 
BuyerAdvoc * Educ .17 (.10) 
Customer Firm-Supplier Relationship Dynamism 
(RelDynamism) .09 (.10) 
BuyerAdvoc * RelDynamism .17* (.07) 
Customer Firm-Supplier Relationship Length (RelLength) .05 (.15) 
BuyerAdvoc * RelLength -.34** (.09) 
Buying Center Size (BCSize) -.14 (.19) 
BuyerAdvoc * BCSize .60** (.17) 
   
Customer Size  -.56** (.15) 
Buyer’s Degree of Autonomy .13 (.12) 
   
Constant 6.81** (.39) 
Var(sj) 7.85** (1.56) 
   
Observations 1,014  
Number of groups 69   
R2 .12  
rho .42  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. I first estimated a separate 
model including higher-order interaction terms (i.e., x2z), one for each of the six 
moderators. The higher order terms for all but Trust were subsequently dropped as they 
were not significant and their inclusion or exclusion did not change the significance or 
magnitude of the estimated remaining interaction terms (i.e., xz). See the method section 
(p.27) for more detail. 
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3.4.6: Results  
Assessing the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship. I begin by taking 
the three steps suggested by Lind and Mehlum (2010) to establish whether an inverted U-
shaped relationship exists between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-level 
sales. First, as expected, I note a significant and negative effect of BuyerAdvoc2 (b = -
.25; p < .01) on sales. Though necessary, this alone is not sufficient to establish a 
quadratic relationship. Therefore, as a second step, I explore whether the slope is 
sufficiently steep at both ends of the data range, in this case buyer advocacy = 1 and 
buyer advocacy = 7. This is accomplished by calculating the marginal effects of buyer 
advocacy at the low end of the range (XL) and the high end of the range (XH), while 
holding constant the standardized moderating variables at zero (i.e., at their mean). As 
expected, the slope at XL, α1 + 2α2XL, is positive and significant (b = 1.06; p < .01) and 
the slope at XH, α1 + 2α2XH, is negative and significant (b = -.42; p < .05). Results of the 
marginal effects analysis at each level of buyer advocacy are provided in Table 3.5.  
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Table 3.5: Marginal Effects of Buyer Advocacy on Sales 
Panel A: Actual scale 
Effect of Buyer Advocacy at: dy/dx 
Std. 
Err. 
Buyer Advocacy = 1 1.06** .29 
Buyer Advocacy = 2 .81** .21 
Buyer Advocacy = 3 .57** .14 
Buyer Advocacy = 4 .32** .08 
Buyer Advocacy = 5 .07 .07 
Buyer Advocacy = 6 -.18 .13 
Buyer Advocacy = 7 -.42* .20 
Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
 
Panel B: Standardized scale 
Effect of Buyer Advocacy at: dy/dx 
Std. 
Err. 
Buyer Advocacy = -3 1.63** .44 
Buyer Advocacy = -2 1.12** .29 
Buyer Advocacy = -1 .61** .15 
Buyer Advocacy = 0 .10 .11 
Buyer Advocacy = 1 -.41 .23 
Buyer Advocacy = 2 -.92* .38 
Buyer Advocacy = 3 -1.43** .54 
Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
 
As a final step, I explore whether the turning point is located within the observed data 
range. Taking the first derivative of Equation 9 (again holding the moderators at their 
mean levels) and setting it equal to zero yields the turning point at -α1/2α2, or .23 
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standard deviations above the mean (i.e., buyer advocacy = 5.42).8 This level is well 
within the data range. Figure 3.6 provides a visual depiction of the turning point with 
buyer advocacy represented by both the actual scale (1 to 7) and a standardized scale (-3 
to 3). Because the results of each step confirm an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-level sales, H1 is supported. 
 Figure 3.6: Buyer Advocacy Predictive Margins 
Panel A: Actual scale (turning point = 5.44; moderators at mean values, equal to zero) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Note: -α1/(2α2) = -.12/(2*-.26) =.23 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Panel B: Standardized scale (turning point = .24 standard deviations)  
 
Assessing the moderating effects of buyer advocacy on suppier sales. I find only 
one of the higher order interactions terms (x2z) to be significant (buyer trust in the 
supplier). In the cases where no higher-order interaction terms were found to be 
significant, the higher-order terms were subsequently dropped for model parsimony, as 
their inclusion/exclusion does not substantially change the significance or magnitude of 
the other estimated terms in the model. 
In support of H2, the interaction between BuyerAdvoc
2 and buyer trust in the 
supplier is negative and significant (b = -.13; p < .05), while the lower-order interaction 
between BuyerAdvoc and buyer trust in the supplier is not significant. In support of H3, 
the interaction between buyer advocacy and buyer’s industry experience is positive and 
significant (b = .24; p < .05). However, counter to my expectation, the effect of the 
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buyer’s level of education on sales is not significant (b = .17; p > .05), H4 is rejected.9 I 
therefore find mixed support for my contention that peak sales occur at higher levels of 
buyer advocacy when the buyer has greater expertise. 
In line with my expectations, the interaction between buyer advocacy and 
customer firm-supplier relationship dynamism is positive and significant (b = .17; p < 
.05). H5 is supported. Likewise, the interaction between buyer advocacy and customer 
firm-supplier relationship length is negative and significant (b = -.34; p < .01), in support 
of H6. My contention that peak sales occurs at higher levels of buyer advocacy when the 
buying center members are inhibited from generating counterarguments to the buyer 
advocate’s messaging is fully supported.  
Finally, while not hypothesized, I find that the interaction between buyer 
advocacy and the size of the buying center is positive and significant (b = .60; p < .01). 
3.5: DISCUSSION 
In this research, I find compelling evidence of the relevance and importance of a 
newly conceptualized construct, buyer advocacy. My results illustrate the complex 
interplay between buyer advocacy, buyer trust in the supplier, buyer expertise, and 
customer firm-supplier relationship dynamism and relationship length on a supplier’s 
customer-level sales. In the following discussion, I revisit my research questions. 
                                                          
9 Note: p = .066.   
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How does buyer advocacy affect the supplier’s customer-level sales? Is buyer 
advocacy always beneficial for the supplier? Are there conditions under which buyer 
advocacy may actually be counterproductive for the supplier? I find that the B2B supplier 
in my study receives greater customer-level sales as a buyer engages in higher levels of 
buyer advocacy, but only to a point, after which additional buyer advocacy has a negative 
effect (Figure 3.6). Results of marginal effects analysis (Table 3.5) show that the 
magnitude of the positive effect of buyer advocacy on the supplier’s customer-level sales 
decreases with increasing levels of buyer advocacy, reaching a turning point near buyer 
advocacy = 5. I find that buyer advocacy actually negatively affects the supplier’s sales at 
buyer advocacy = 7, the most extreme positive condition. These findings support my 
theoretical rationale that a latent countervailing mechanism is present, namely that a 
buyer who overly advocates for a supplier risks being perceived by buying center 
members as having lost objectivity, lack of proficiency, or potentially suffering from 
cognitive bias, resulting in damaged credibility. Buying center members’ perceived risk 
that the buyer advocate is overly optimistic about the supplier increases rapidly with 
increasing buyer advocacy, manifesting as a nonlinear, convex latent mechanism. As 
theorized, combining the expected positive linear effects of buyer advocacy on the 
supplier’s sales and the convex negative effects of buyer advocacy on the supplier’s sales 
results in an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
3.5.1: The Moderating Role of Buyer Trust in the Supplier 
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What factors moderate the relationship between buyer advocacy and the 
supplier’s customer-level sales? Drawing from cognitive response theory, I theorize that 
as the buyer advocate signals increasing objectivity regarding its evaluation of the 
supplier, the rate at which increasing buyer advocacy produces suspicion among the other 
members of the buying center is attenuated. Specifically, I propose that when the buyer 
advocate maintains a low to moderate level of trust in the supplier, is advocacy is 
perceived as more balanced and practical. I find strong empirical support for this 
rationale. Figure 3.7 illustrates how the inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer 
advocacy and the supplier’s sales flattens as buyer trust in the supplier decreases, 
ultimately producing a “shape-flipping” effect (Haans et al. 2016). In other words, the 
relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales becomes U-shaped, or 
convex at low levels of buyer trust in the supplier.  
 Figure 3.7: Moderating Role of Buyer Trust in the Supplier (-3 to 3 std. devs from mean) 
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3.5.2: The Moderating Role of Buyer Expertise 
Further, I theorize that buyer advocacy is more effective at gaining consensus 
among the members of the buying center when the buyer advocate has more (a) education 
and (b) industry experience, factors that increase the buyer’s expertise as perceived by 
other members of the buying center. For this contention, I find mixed support. While I 
indeed find a positive interaction effect between buyer industry experience and buyer 
advocacy on the supplier’s customer-level sales, I find no significant interaction between 
buyer advocacy and buyer education. The reason may be that industry experience is the 
dominant indicator of buyer expertise in this context, and that formal education is 
perceived as less relevant to others within the buying center.  
 Figure 3.8: Moderating Role of Buyer Industry Experience (-1 to 1 std. devs from mean) 
  
Interestingly, from the plot of the estimated marginal predictions (Figure 3.8), it is 
evident that when buyers have greater than average industry experience, the rightward 
shift of the inverted U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s 
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sales is significant enough to exclude any negative slope following the turning point from 
the observed range of buyer advocacy values. In other words, while the magnitude of the 
positive effect decreases with increasing levels of buyer advocacy, when buyer advocates 
have greater than average industry experience, there is no point at which buyer advocacy 
negatively affects the supplier’s sales, a point confirmed with marginal effects analysis. 
At best, when the buying center member has high industry experience, the effect of buyer 
advocacy is positive, and at worst, buyer advocacy has no effect on the supplier’s sales. 
Further, Figure 3.8 illustrates the extreme importance of buyer advocacy when the buyer 
has a high level of experience, for it appears that experienced buying center members’ 
lack of advocacy for a supplier also sends a strong signal to the other members of the 
buying center, negatively affecting the supplier’s sales. 
3.5.3: The Moderating Role of Customer Firm-Supplier Relationship Dynamism and 
Length 
Again, drawing from the cognitive response model, I theorize that buyer advocacy 
is more effective at gaining consensus among the members of the buying center when 
customer firm-supplier relationship dynamism is greater and relationship length is 
shorter, as each affects the degree to which buying center members are able to form 
counterarguments to the buyer advocate’s message. I find full support for this contention. 
As relationship dynamism increases, the turning point of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales shifts rightward (Figure 
3.9). Similar to the moderating effects of buyer industry experience, I find that when 
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relationship dynamism is greater than average, the risk that buyer advocacy produces 
negative effects is mitigated such that buyer advocacy produces positive or neutral effects 
on the supplier’s sales at all levels within the observed range. 
Figure 3.9: Moderating Role of Customer Firm-Supplier Relationship Dynamism (-1 to 1 
std. devs from mean) 
 
On the other hand, in line with cognitive response theory, as relationship length between 
the customer firm and supplier increases, the turning point of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales shifts in the opposite 
direction, from right to left (Figure 3.10).  
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Figure 3.10: Moderating Role of Customer Firm-Supplier Relationship Length (-1 to 1 
std. deviations from mean) 
 
 
3.5.4: The Moderating Role of Buying Center Size 
 When considering the moderating effect of buying center size on the inverted U-
shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales, I presented two 
competing arguments. On the one hand, buyer advocacy may become increasingly 
critical for the supplier as the size of the buying center grows, because consensus among 
buying center members becomes increasingly difficult to obtain with each addition to the 
buying center. This line of reason would imply that buyer advocacy enhances the positive 
effect of buyer advocacy on favorable consensus generation. On the other hand, as the 
size of the buying center grows, buyers may find it increasingly difficult to effectively 
advocate in a way that appeals to the diverse perspectives of each additional member of 
the buying center.  
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The results of my analysis are consistent with the former line of reasoning, i.e., 
that the positive effect of buyer advocacy on the supplier’s sales is enhanced with 
increasing buying center size, such that the turning point of the U-shaped relationship 
between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales shifts to the right. Cognitive response 
theory may provide an explanation for these results as well. As the size of the buying 
center increases, there are an increasing number of individuals presenting messaging to 
the group. Therefore, each individual member of the group must process an increasing 
amount of information, resulting in cognitive strain, nonelaborative processing and 
deferral to external sources (Kumkale, Albarracin, and Seignourel 2010). Ultimately, 
these factors inhibit buying center members’ ability to form counterarguments to the 
buyer advocate’s message.  
3.5.5: Theoretical Implications 
 Cognitive response theory has been shown to provide very accurate predictions of 
the results of my analysis. While marketing researchers have primarily tested the 
cognitive response model experimentally involving individuals in consumer settings, I 
find that it may also extend well to B2B settings to explain the cognitive responses of 
individuals involved in group decision making. As organizations increasingly rely on 
groups to make decisions (Osmani 2016), cognitive response theory may serve as an 
important theoretical framework for understanding B2B buying center dynamics.  
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 Additionally, in this research I provide theoretical understanding of the inverted 
U-shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s customer-level sales, 
and how two latent underlying mechanisms combine to produce the proposed pattern of 
effects. Additionally, I theorize how five moderating factors enhance or attenuate the 
underlying linear mechanism positively affecting the supplier’s sales. In so doing, I 
answer the call by Haans et al. 2016 for researchers to further explore U-shaped 
relationships in the field of strategic marketing management while respecting the 
additional intricacies of such relationships compared to simple linear relationships.    
3.5.6: Managerial Implications 
 The findings of this research offer practitioners many important takeaways. First 
is the warning that under certain circumstances, buyer advocacy at its extreme can 
actually have a negative effect on the supplier’s customer-level sales. This finding 
underscores the importance for managers and salespeople of the supplier firm to carefully 
assess each buyer with which they are partnered on the basis of the buyer’s expertise, as 
well as relationship length and dynamism of the customer firm of which the buyer is a 
member. These factors serve as important customer-level contingencies that, in my 
research context, determined the direction of the relationship between buyer advocacy 
and the supplier’s sales. If proper considerations are taken, the risk that buyer advocacy 
will produce negative outcomes can be mitigated (Figures 7,8,9,10). 
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Further, examining the moderating effects of the buyer’s industry experience 
(Figure 3.8), the negative effect of low buyer advocacy when industry experience is high 
is of great prominence. Managers should note that when buying center members with 
high experience are not advocating for the supplier, it may be producing especially 
harmful outcomes. This leads to the interesting notion that what influential members of 
the buying center don’t say to others may be just as telling and impactful as what they do 
say. 
 Additionally, my analysis suggests that representatives from supplier firms should 
seek to enable and equip specific buyers to advocate on the supplier’s behalf, including 
those who operate in large, dynamic buying centers with shorter histories transacting with 
the supplier. It is under these circumstances, that buyer advocacy is most critical and has 
the most positive effect on the supplier’s financial outcomes.   
3.5.7: Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The limitations of my research are those associated with collaborations with a 
single firm. Nevertheless, as my data are drawn from a typical industrial wholesaler, my 
findings are generalizable to similar reseller contexts. Future research could explore the 
proposed underlying mechanisms based in cognitive response theory using an 
experimental approach in order to generalize the latent process beyond this single firm 
context.  
Additionally, I conceptualize buyer advocacy as an episodic phenomenon 
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exhibiting variation between buying group members and over time. In this research, I 
operationalize buyer advocacy at the buyer level. However, I also posit that buyer 
advocacy could be examined by focusing on specific episodes of buyer advocacy and 
examining variation in buyer advocacy over time.  
3.6: CONCLUSION 
In this research, I shed light on the research priorities regarding evolving B2B 
buyer behavior as emphasized by both ISBM and MSI. I show the importance of buyer 
advocacy in B2B buying centers and its effects on supplier sales at the customer level. I 
theoretically justify and offer evidence of a positive effect on the supplier’s sales while 
also uncovering an important countervailing mechanism, resulting in an inverted U-
shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales. An extremely high 
level of buyer advocacy risks damaging the buyer’s credibility with other members of the 
buying center, a cautionary note for both suppliers and buying center members 
advocating on the supplier’s behalf. Buyer advocacy is a powerful and important tool that 
can serve the intersecting interests of the customer and supplier and is worthy of future 
research attention.  
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CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION 
As the average firm in the U.S. becomes larger and as corporations continue to 
displace small proprietorships in the marketplace, both salespeople and buyers are finding 
it more difficult to directly access decision makers within the other’s organization. 
Through two independent essays, this dissertation investigates two common, yet 
understudied, forms of agency relationships found in today’s business-to-business (B2B) 
markets. 
In Essay 1, I find that salesperson’s customer advocacy is a fundamental aspect of 
the salesperson’s role as mediator between the seller firm and the customer. Because 
extant marketing research has failed to account for this important aspect of the 
salesperson’s dual role, this research fills an important gap in the literature. Relying on 
well-established assumptions grounded in agency theory, I offer evidence that the 
salesperson can allay the suspicion of both customers and seller decision-makers by 
demonstrating allegiance to the focal party. In doing so, I demonstrate the importance for 
researchers and practitioners to consider both aspects of the salesperson’s dual role when 
considering frontline issues. The effects of the salesperson’s actions to represent the 
seller to the customer and the customer to the seller are closely intertwined and 
interrelated, and focusing on either form of salesperson action in isolation could lead to 
inaccurate conclusions. My results indicate that salesperson’s customer advocacy has 
complex effects on net profit, increasing discounting as well as customer sales and cross-
buying. Salesperson’s customer advocacy is a powerful and important tool for the 
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salesperson, and I hope this research sparks increased study of this particular aspect of 
the salesperson’s dual role.  
In Essay 2, I shed light on the research priorities regarding evolving B2B buyer 
behavior as emphasized by both ISBM and MSI. I show the importance of buyer 
advocacy in B2B buying centers and its effects on supplier sales at the customer level. I 
theoretically justify and offer evidence of a positive effect on the supplier’s sales while 
also uncovering an important countervailing mechanism, resulting in an inverted U-
shaped relationship between buyer advocacy and the supplier’s sales. An extremely high 
level of buyer advocacy risks damaging the buyer’s credibility with other members of the 
buying center, a cautionary note for both suppliers and buying center members 
advocating on the supplier’s behalf. Buyer advocacy is a powerful and important tool that 
can serve the intersecting interests of the customer and supplier and is worthy of future 
research attention.  
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APPENDIX 
A.1: IRB Approval for Customer Survey 
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A.2: IRB Approval for Salesperson Survey 
 
 
128 
 
A.3: Value-based Selling from Qualtrics Customer Survey 
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A.4: Salesperson’s Customer Advocacy from Qualtrics Salesperson Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
VITA 
 Justin M. Lawrence was born on December 7th, 1982 in Des Moines, IA. He 
received his Bachelor’s of Science in Finance from Iowa State University, and his 
Master’s in Business Administration with an emphasis in Finance from the University of 
Iowa. Prior to earning his Ph.D. from the University of Missouri in Business 
Administration with an emphasis in Marketing, he spent nearly ten years in industry. His 
most recent role was Director, Pricing for a Fortune 500 industrial wholesaler. In the fall 
of 2017, he will be joining Utah State University as an assistant professor of Marketing.  
 
